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Pay-As-You-Drive insurance (PAYD) where insurance customers can be charged directly for when, 
where, and how they drive, is now possible thanks to modern telematics technology. PAYD addresses 
many problems with traditional insurance in terms of more fairly, and transparently, charging users 
for their driving behaviour and lessens the impacts of insurance on lower socioeconomic groups in 
particular (Adkins, 2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2005a; Litman, 2011). Indeed, some estimates 
of PAYD in the USA have suggested that if it was implemented two thirds of households would benef it, 
with savings of around $270 USD per car per year (Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2011).
However, PAYD insurance does not only have the potential to benef it individuals. Rather, it is estimated 
to have signif icant societal impacts, including possible reductions in mileage of up to 8-12% (Adkins, 
2004; Balcombe et al., 2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Harvey & Deakin, 1998; Litman, 2005a; Litman, 
2011), which could then be associated with accident reductions of 12-18% (Litman, 2011). Furthermore, it 
is also estimated that even an 8% reduction in mileage would reduce CO2 emissions by 2% and petrol 
consumption by 4%. This reduction in petrol consumption would be equivalent to the effect of a $1 
USD per gallon increase in the price of petrol (Bordoff & Noel, 2008). It is also estimated that PAYD 
insurance may reduce the prof its of insurance companies (Adkins, 2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 
2011). It is therefore recommended that, due to the signif icant societal gains associated with PAYD 
insurance, governments examine what they can do to help encourage PAYD insurance despite the 
potential costs to insurance companies (Adkins, 2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2011). 
The above estimates are mostly based on economic and transport models and therefore may not 
completely ref lect reality. Assessing the real world impacts of PAYD insurance, however, is diff icult as it 
is a relatively new idea and data on its effectiveness is obviously commercially sensitive. A few research 
projects have been carried out and have tended to f ind signif icant, yet more modest in some cases, 
impacts of PAYD on driving. These effects have included reductions in speeding in the case of Pay-As-
You-Speed additions to PAYD insurance (Bolderdijk, Knockaert, Steg, & Verhoef, 2011; Greaves & Fifer, 
2011; Mazureck & van Hattem, 2006), along with reductions in mileage under both Pay-As-You-Speed 
and mileage based PAYD conditions (Buxbaum, 2006; Greaves & Fifer, 2011). However, one weakness 
of all of these experimental trials of PAYD insurance is that unlike with real PAYD insurance customers 
experiment pariticpants never had to pay any costs and could only receive, sometimes very sizable 
(Greaves & Fifer, 2011), rewards based on their driving behaviour. That participants in experiments 
cannot be charged is a somewhat unavoidable aspect of experimental research due to ethical concerns 
and highlights the need for evaluations of commercial PAYD insurance products.
There are many possible types of PAYD insurance. Ranging from pre-paid options where customers 
pre-purchase a certain number amount of mileage and are then charged based on additional mileage 
driven, to full behaviour based telematics PAYD insurance where drivers can be rewarded or penalised 
based on not only how much they drive, but also on where, when, and how they drive (Bordoff & Noel, 
2008; Litman, 2005a; Litman, 2011). This, later, behaviour based PAYD can be expected to be the most 
effective due to its capability to provide richer and more immediate feedback on driver behaviour 
that is currently sorely lacking in the road environment (Fuller, 1984; Näätänen & Summala, 1974; 
Rothengatter, 1988; Rothengatter, 2002; Skinner, 1974; Thorndike, 1911; Watson, 1917). This is signif icant 
as the earlier provided estimates for the effectiveness of PAYD insurance, due to the well-established link 
between mileage and accident risk (Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Evans, 2004; Litman, 2011), are mostly based 
on a simple mileage based charge (Adkins, 2004; Balcombe et al., 2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Harvey 
& Deakin, 1998; Litman, 2005a; Litman, 2011). Therefore, if more behavioural focused PAYD insurance 
was introduced, in addition to a mileage based system, the positive impacts on society may be further 
enhanced. 
In terms of behaviour based PAYD insurance there is one promising behavioural candidate. That 
is acceleration behaviour, which can be taken as an indication of both risky and environmentally 
unfriendly driving and is relatively easily monitored by modern telematics (Af Wåhlberg, 2008; 
Barkenbus, 2010). In addition to acceleration, there is also an opportunity to add advisory intelligent 












when they exceed the speed limit. Advisory ISA has been shown to enhance the impacts of PAYD 
insurance (Lahrmann, Agerholm, Tradisauskas, Berthelsen, & Harms, 2011), as well as having signif icant 
speed reducing qualities by themselves (e.g. Brookhuis & de Waard, 1999; Lahrmann et al., 2011; Päätalo, 
Peltola, & Kallio, 2002; Sundberg, 1999).
Regardless of the type of PAYD insurance, people are likely to have privacy concerns about having their 
driving monitored, which may reduce their acceptance of PAYD insurance (Bolderdijk, Steg, & Postmes, 
2012; Ogden, 2001; Schlag & Teubel, 1997; Schlag & Teubel, 1997; Zweig & Webster, 2002). To minimise 
these concerns, research suggests that care should be taken to stress the signif icant individual benef its 
of PAYD, as people who benef it from a technology are less likely to be concerned about privacy 
(Bolderdijk, Steg, & Postmes, 2012). Furthermore, if people can be convinced to experience PAYD 
insurance, for example through a free trial period, privacy concerns may decrease and user acceptance 
of the system may increase (Buxbaum, 2006). A free trial period may also make customers feel that 
they should reciprocate this ‘generosity’ by signing up for PAYD insurance (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). 
Furthermore, framing PAYD insurance in terms of only benef iting drivers by using it to calculate a 
discount on a future f lat rate insurance bill may also help to increase acceptance of PAYD. 
PAYD insurance is effectively a delivery system for incentives, i.e. for rewards and penalties. Therefore, 
it is important that the incentives are structured and presented correctly within any PAYD insurance 
product to maximise their effectiveness. Both rewards and penalties are effective when behaviour is 
relatively certain to be rewarded or penalised and when the reward or penalty follows swiftly after the 
target behaviour. The actual size of the reward or penalty that is received is less important (Bjørnskau 
& Elvik, 1992; Skinner, 1974; Zaal, 1994). Indeed, in terms of reward size, there is evidence to suggest that 
instead of directly giving feedback on monetary savings, that points or some other medium could be 
used. It turns out that individuals are not particularly sensitive to the trade-offs between this medium 
and the eventual reward (Bagchi & Li, 2011; Hsee, Yu, Zhang, & Zhang, 2003). This means that points 
could be varied more freely or in larger amounts but trade off to relatively small f inancial savings 
while still having a signif icant impact on driver behaviour. Given the paramount importance of the 
swiftness of receiving rewards, penalties and feedback (Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, & Rothengatter, 2005; 
Lehman, Geller, & Bolderdijk, In Press; Skinner, 1974) it is therefore recommended that feedback on 
both behaviour and any rewards or penalties is given via an in-car device as part of a PAYD insurance 
system. 
When it comes to rewards versus penalties the advice from psychology is resoundingly clear. Rewards 
should be used and penalties avoided (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Gneezy, Meier, & Rey-Biel, 2011; Lattal, 
2010; Renner, 1964; Skinner, 1953; Skinner, 1974; Thorndike, 1911; Watson, 1917). Rewards are favoured 
as they communicate information on what should be done in the future, rather than just saying that 
someone has done something wrong. Rewards also have the potential to create positive associations 
between receiving the reward and otherwise somewhat dull tasks, such as driving safely (Bandura, 
1986). 
That is not to say that rewards have not been criticised, and there is indeed considerable debate 
about the potentially negative impacts of providing external rewards on individual’s intrinsic motivation 
to perform behaviours (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Cameron, Banko, & Pierce, 2001; Deci, Koestner, 
& Ryan, 1999; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 2001). The debate about the negative effects of rewards is 
focused on the controlling aspects of giving rewards and is also focused primarily only on tasks that 
are interesting and in themselves intrinsically motivating (Deci, 1971; Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001; 
Kohn, 1999). Therefore, while the possible demotivating effects of rewards are important to be aware 
of, they may not apply to PAYD insurance, which essentially aims to reward relatively dull safety related 
behaviours. Furthermore, many of the negative effects reported typically only hold once a reward is 
removed or in once off, non-repeated, reward situations (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Cameron et al., 
2001). PAYD insurance, however, is a repeated reward that would essentially always be present unless 
a customer changed to a non-PAYD insurance plan. Still, care can be taken to further minimise any 












rewards are provided in a non-judgemental and non-controlling fashion (Brehm, 1966; Deci et al., 1999; 
Deci et al., 2001; Skinner, 1972). Positive feedback on behaviour provided in a non-controlling fashion 
has been found to actually increase, rather than decrease, intrinsic motivations to perform a behaviour 
(Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Cameron et al., 2001; Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001).
There are other ways in which the provision of rewards, penalties, or feedback can be enhanced or 
behaviour changed in association with PAYD insurance. Firstly, people tend to respond and conform 
to authority (Cialdini, 2001). However, it is best if this authority is exerted in a soft or expert fashion 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). That is to say that authority that comes from someone who has shown 
that they are credible and capable is more likely to be conformed to than authority that just comes 
along with a particular position in society. Insurance companies can therefore take advantage of soft 
authority by demonstrating their own credibility as well as partnering with credible experts when 
promoting PAYD insurance. However, much like with the provision of rewards care should be taken to 
not appear controlling when exerting authority (Brehm, 1966; Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001; Skinner, 
1972). 
In addition to conforming to authority, people also have a general tendency to conform to others 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Lehman et al., In Press). This tendency to conform is particularly strong if 
they like (Cialdini, 2001; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) and/or perceive that they are similar in some way 
with the person or organisation that is making the request (Lehman et al., In Press). In terms of PAYD 
insurance, this can be taken advantage of by providing attractive user interfaces for PAYD systems, 
good customer service, getting high status people to use PAYD insurance, and by relating to clients 
via similar beliefs or attitudes. In addition to liking and similarity, people are also likely to conform with 
others if they believe that other people know something they do not (informative inf luence) or just 
to f it in with a crowd (normative inf luence) (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Cialdini, 2001; Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004). This tendency to go along with others can be taken advantage of by providing information on 
what others are doing. However, such information provision can also backf ire in that it could signal 
that a behaviour, e.g. speeding, if done by a majority is in fact acceptable rather than problematic 
behaviour that needs to change. 
In fact, providing information that compares an individual with others has been shown to sometimes 
result in negative outcomes (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Lehman et al., In Press). For instance when 
information on average household energy use was provided around a neighbourhood, those who 
were high energy users decreased their use but those who were low energy users actually increased 
their energy use (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). The negative effects of 
comparisons are even stronger if tied to competition elements, which generally speaking appear to only 
motivate high performers while at the same time demotivating those who do not perceive they can win 
(Bull, Schotter, & Weigelt, 1987; Dye, 1984). Comparisons and competition within the context of a PAYD 
system may also raise privacy concerns with customers and therefore reduce acceptance. 
In comparison to providing comparisons there is more promise to be had in terms of asking people 
to make commitments or getting them to set goals for themselves (Cialdini, 2001; Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004; Lehman & Geller, 2004; Lehman et al., In Press). Care should be taken that commitments or goals 
are set voluntarily and that people do not feel controlled or manipulated. However, assuming that 
people do choose to make a commitment or goal, say to save money on their insurance, then they 
are more likely to change their behaviour than people who do not make such commitments (Cialdini, 
2001; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Lehman & Geller, 2004; Lehman et al., In Press). This is especially the 
case if the commitment or goal is made publically (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Cialdini, 2001), if the individual is 
provided with prompts (such as a sticker on their car) and feedback (such as from an in-car interface) 
to remind them of their commitment/goal (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Bagchi & Li, 2011; Lehman & Geller, 
2004; Lehman et al., In Press), and if modelling is used to show the individual how they can best meet 
their commitment or goal (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Bandura, 1967; Lehman et al., In Press). 
The way in which a reward or request is framed can also impact its eff icacy. In particular, individuals 












advantage of in PAYD insurance by starting people off with already some progress towards a reward, 
which they may lose if they do not drive in a safe or eco-friendly manner. Another framing effect could 
be in terms of presenting benef its of PAYD in reference to monetary, safety, or environmental impacts, 
all of which may have different impacts on how people behave (e.g. Bolderdijk, Steg, Geller, Lehman, & 
Postmes, 2012; Delhomme, Chappé, Grenier, Pinto, & Martha, 2010). Safety messages in particular may 
be diff icult in terms of informing drivers that they are unsafe. This is because the majority of drivers 
see themselves as safe and competent (McKenna, Stanier, & Lewis, 1991; McKenna, 1993), therefore, any 
information they receive to the contrary may put this self-image at risk and lead them to reject or 
ignore the information. 
Many of the above techniques, particularly the addition of rewards and the use of comparisons and 
competition have recently been rebranded under the heading of gamif ication (Deterding, Dixon, 
Khaled, & Nacke, 2011). Gamif ication is the addition of game design elements to a non-game setting 
in an effort to increase motivation to perform a non-game activity. Aside from the association with 
games it is not, however, particularly different from the underlying behavioural and social psychological 
ideas it rebrands. Plus, as already mentioned the idea of providing comparative data or competition, 
something that is often done in gamif ication, appears to carry with it the risk of unintended 
consequences and demotivation (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Bull et al., 1987; Lehman et al., In Press). 
Gamif ication therefore should be treated with care. 
Ultimately, PAYD insurance does have the potential to benef it individuals and society (Adkins, 2004; 
Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2011). In particular behaviour based telematic PAYD insurance with in-
car feedback f its well with the principles of effective incentives (Fuller, 1984; Näätänen & Summala, 1974; 
Rothengatter, 1988; Rothengatter, 2002; Skinner, 1974; Thorndike, 1911; Watson, 1917) and if structured 
and promoted correctly (Cialdini, 2001; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Lehman & Geller, 2004; Lehman et al., 













This report is the f irst deliverable of the “Feedback from Pay-As-You-Drive insurance, both outside 
and inside the car” project commissioned by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment and 
Univé. The aim of this report is to provide an overview of the literature on Pay-As-You-Drive (PAYD) 
insurance and its effects. As well as providing an overview of potential ways that rewards, penalties and 
information can be provided to PAYD insurance customers to encourage them to accept, and increase 
the effectiveness, of PAYD insurance. 
As such, this report has been split into several sections. The f irst section, section 2, introduces PAYD 
insurance, looks at the expected impacts of PAYD insurance (section 2.1), provides information on 
privacy concerns related to PAYD insurance (section 2.2), and gives examples of the different types 
(section 2.3) and variants of PAYD insurance that are available (sections 2.4 and 2.4.1).
The next section, section 3, goes into the current research on rewards, penalties, and feedback. This 
section includes information on how to effectively use rewards, penalties, and feedback (section 3.1), 
whether rewards or penalties should be used and the potential disadvantages of both (sections 3.2 
and 3.2.1), and some information on the current use of rewards, penalties, and feedback in the driving 
environment (section 3.3). 
Section 4 of this paper looks at additional persuasive behaviour change techniques other than rewards 
or penalties. This section includes sections on conforming to authority (section 4.1), conforming to 
others (section 4.2), comparison and competition (section 4.3), consistency, commitment and goal 
setting (section 4.4), framing (section 4.5), prompts and modelling (section 4.6), and reciprocity (section 
4.7).
Separate from the methods examined in section 4, there is also a small section on gamif ication (section 
5). This section brief ly introduces gamif ication and discusses if it can add anything to the measures 
already discussed in sections 3 and 4. 
Finally, section 6 brings the document together and provides some recommendations for PAYD 











Pay-As-You-Drive (PAYD) insurance is a relatively new model of vehicle insurance where some or all 
of what customers pay for insurance is based on their individual driving behaviour rather than their 
aggregate, estimated, risk. The simplest form of PAYD insurance is based on a charge per kilometre 
driven, i.e. based on a drivers mileage. Mileage based PAYD can be accessed via odometer checks or 
via more advanced telemetry equipment. However, the basic principle is the same in that those who 
consume more, i.e. drive more, pay more. The interest in PAYD insurance is in part driven by concerns 
that traditional insurance methods are unfair and relatively behaviour insensitive (Adkins, 2004; Bordoff 
& Noel, 2008; Litman, 2005a; Litman, 2011). In addition, PAYD insurance is also associated with the 
general goals of increasing road safety, reducing congestion, and lowering the environmental impacts 
of road transport (Balcombe et al., 2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2011; Zantema, van Amelsfort, 
Bliemer, & Bovy, 2008). 
It may be odd to discuss environmental impacts when talking about a road safety focused measure 
such as insurance. However, safe and eco-friendly driving are very closely associated, with many of the 
driving behaviours that are considered safe also being related to driving in an environmental friendly 
fashion. For instance driving less, driving at consistent low speeds, not rapidly accelerating or braking, 
and driving in a proactive rather than reactive fashion all have positive safety impacts as well as being 
eco-friendly (Barkenbus, 2010). Therefore if PAYD insurance can impact on safety it will also have f low 
on effects to environmental impacts and congestion, which could perhaps also be used to promote 
PAYD insurance.  
Under traditional insurance there is some stratif ication of clients based on their ‘risk prof ile’. This 
generally includes factors such as what car they are driving, where they live, and their age. However, 
once placed in a broad category everyone in that category pays pretty much the same no matter 
their income, how much they drive, or how safely they drive. This aggreation has adverse effects on 
people who, based on aggregate information, are classif ied as ‘high risk’, but who based on their own 
individual driving would be seen as ‘low risk’. It is also claimed that traditional insurance is particularly 
unfair to low income individuals who are often classif ied into ‘high risk’ insurance categories based on 
where they live (urban areas), due to the older, and therefore less crashworthy, types of cars they drive, 
and sometimes based on their age (young people tend to have less income) (Adkins, 2004; Bordoff & 
Noel, 2008; Litman, 2005a; Litman, 2011). However, low income individuals also tend to drive less than 
high income individuals (due to the cost of fuel), which lowers their accident risk. At the same time those 
with a lower income are much less able to afford insurance. In fact, car insurance is often one of the 
largest single costs facing low income families (Adkins, 2004; Litman, 2011). High insurance costs can lead 
to those with low income driving without insurance, which places extra costs on society in the case of 
an accident. In fact, the proportion of uninsured vehicles in US low income communities is estimated 
to be as high as 50% (Hunstad, 1999). The high cost of insurance can also lead low income individuals 
to decide to not purchase a vehicle in the f irst place and limits their access to employment and other 
opportunities (Adkins, 2004; Litman, 2011). Therefore, a move to a fairer, PAYD insurance, type system 
where individuals are charged for how much and the way they drive would give low income individuals 
more control over their insurance bills and make owning a vehicle more affordable. Furthermore, since 
low income individuals have fewer resources they are also likely to be more responsive to the changes 
of insurance costs under a PAYD system and therefore be motivated to drive in a safe and eco-friendly 
manner (Litman, 2011). 
The traditional, f lat rate, approach to insurance has also been compared to all you can eat restaurants 
(Litman, 2011) or cell phone plans (Litman, 2005a). With the argument being that paying a f lat rate, 
rather than for how much you use, leads to increases in consumption. In the case of an all you can eat 
restaurant that means eating more, or more calling on a cell phone plan, or in the case of insurance, an 
increase in driving. Since driving more is related to accident risk, congestion, and environmental impacts 
it is therefore suggested that the current method of insurance actually encourages and supports unsafe, 
ineff icient, and environmentally damaging behaviour (Adkins, 2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2005; 
Litman, 2011). Economists in particular refer to the ‘externalities’ that traditional insurance creates. 

















directly born by the consumer or the seller (Edlin, 2008). In the case of traditional insurance the full 
externalities of driving, in terms of the impact on safety, congestion, and the environment are not 
currently well addressed and therefore the prices in the market do not ref lect the true cost of driving 
and in fact underestimate it. As such, according to economic theory, this lack of true price signals 
will also encourage driving and therefore have negative societal impacts. While drivers do not often 
operate under the price sensitive utility maximisation that would support the economic view on driving 
(Rothengatter, 2002), PAYD insurance does have the potential to internalise some of these otherwise 
external costs and make them more apparent to drivers, which may in turn inf luence their driving 
behaviour. 
In addition to these larger scale economic externalities, driving at an individual level is quite forgiving 
of risky behaviour (Evans, 2004; Fuller, 1984; Näätänen & Summala, 1974). This means that unsafe 
driving behaviour can be performed on a regular basis with no negative consequence and perhaps 
even without the driver’s awareness that what they are doing is unsafe (Fuller, 1984; Lewis-Evans & 
Charlton, 2006; Lewis-Evans, de Waard, Jolij, & Brookhuis, 2012; Näätänen & Summala, 1974). Another 
troublesome factor is that safe behaviours, such as driving at safe speeds or maintaining good following 
distances, can be punished by time delays or boredom during every day driving. Whereas objectively 
risky behaviour such as speeding is rewarded not only by gains in time, but also by the pleasurable 
sensations associated with speed, and the social approval of peers (OECD-ECMT, 2006b; Rothengatter, 
1988). PAYD insurance therefore opens the opportunity to offer rewards to safe drivers and make the 
costs of driving in a risky fashion more immediate and clear. 
Related to the externalities discussed above it is also argued that traditional insurance is unfair to 
most insurance customers (Adkins, 2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2005a; Litman, 2011). In short, 
the high risks of certain individuals are never fully covered by traditional car insurance, as it would 
mean pricing insurance much too high for these high risk individuals. This means that the costs of the 
claims that high risk individuals generate must be spread across other, less risky, clients effectively 
driving up the cost of their insurance despite their relatively safer, and therefore also more eco-
friendly, driving behaviour. PAYD insurance addresses this issue by more directly charging individuals 
for their own driving behaviour. That is not to say that group factors would not pay a part in a 
PAYD system as these factors are still safety critical and therefore important in order to establish a 
fair PAYD insurance rate. For example a PAYD driver in an urban area, where there tend to be more 
accidents per kilometre travelled, should pay more per kilometre driven than a PAYD driver on a dual 
carriageway. Similarly, other aggregate risk factors, such as age, gender, or driving at night, can be 
taken into account as modif iers on the base rate of PAYD insurance. Although, it should be noted that 
basing insurance charges on gender has recently been ruled as illegal under European law and this is 
likely to also apply to PAYD insurance (InfoCuria). However, a driver behaviour, rather than mileage, 
based PAYD system could address the issues of high speed and unsafe accelerations that are typically 
associated with male drivers (OECD-ECMT, 2006b) without the need to specif ically target them.
As mentioned earlier the most common form of PAYD is mileage based, where drivers pay a fee per 
kilometre or mile driven. This is due to the well-established relationship between mileage, accident 
rates, and environmental impacts (Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Evans, 2004; Litman, 2011). The relationship 
between mileage and accident risk is particularly robust and is often presented in terms of a linear 
relationship between driving more and the risk of being involved in an accident. This is not completely 
accurate, however, as the true relationship between accident risk and mileage is somewhat non-linear 
(Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Evans, 2004; Litman, 2005a; Litman, 2011). The non-linear nature of the mileage-
safety relationship is due to several factors such as; the relatively rare Poisson distribution of accidents, 
that older motorists or those with disabilities tend to drive less, yet have a greater risk of being hurt 
in an accident, that high mileage drivers have more driving experience and therefore are relatively 
more competent, that newer and therefore safer vehicles tend to be driven further, whereas older, 
less safe, vehicles tend to have lower mileages, and that high mileage driving is more often done on 
relatively safe separated highways whereas low mileage driving is often carried out in relatively risky 

















above, it is important to take the above factors into account when deciding on a per kilometre charge 
for PAYD insurance. However, despite this non-linear relationship the rule that if mileage increases so 
does accident risk can still be generally applied. So even if a high mileage driver is somewhat safer due 
to their experience, it is still generally true that if they drive more their risk of being in an accident will 
increase. It should also be noted that if a road user drives less then this has f low on effects to other 
road users who are now also, generally speaking, less at risk due to reduced traff ic f lows. These wider 
societal impacts of reduced mileage are diff icult to ref lect in PAYD charges, yet it certainly impacts on 
the wider benef its that PAYD insurance could provide for society (Adkins, 2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008; 
Litman, 2005a; Litman, 2011).
2.1 The effects of PAYD insurance
While PAYD insurance is offered by several providers around the world (see section 2.3 for examples) 
they are being operated by commercial entities and therefore information on their effectiveness is often 
commercially sensitive and not widely available. However, in terms of mileage reduction, mileage based 
PAYD insurance has been estimated by researchers to reduce vehicle travel by 8-12% (Adkins, 2004; 
Balcombe et al., 2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Harvey & Deakin, 1998; Litman, 2005a; Litman, 2011). 
These estimates are dependent, however, on assumptions made about how much PAYD insurance 
would cost and how the product would be structured. For example Litman (2011) states that a 4 cent 
(USD) per mile fee would reduce vehicle travel by 10%. Whereas others have estimated that a 6.5 cent 
(USD) per mile fee would reduce travel by 10-12% (Balcombe et al., 2004; Harvey & Deakin, 1998). 
Assuming that the estimated drops in mileage are correct then the safety benef its of PAYD insurance 
are large. With a 10% drop in mileage also estimated to result in a 12-18% reduction in accidents 
(Litman, 2011). Even if the smaller estimate of only an 8% mileage reduction made by Bordoff & Noel 
(2008) is taken into account and applied to the whole population of the USA it would result in an 
estimated reduction of $50-60 billion USD in driving related harms, a reduction of CO2 emissions by 2%, 
and a reduction in petrol consumption by 4%. To put this estimated 4% reduction in petrol consumption 
into perspective, it is also estimated that it would take a $1 USD increase in the price of petrol per 
gallon to produce the same effect. In addition to the direct environmental impacts the reduction in 
petrol consumption would also have socio-political impacts in terms of the power of oil producing 
countries (Bordoff & Noel, 2008). 
Not all estimates of the impact of PAYD insurance have been as positive. For example, one study in the 
Netherlands has estimated that a voluntary f lat cost 4 euro cent per kilometre PAYD system would 
only result in a 1% reduction in accidents, and an approximately 2.5% decrease in average travel times 
(Zantema et al., 2008). The same study estimated that a government mandated PAYD insurance 
system with road (0.6 euro cents per kilometre on the motorway, 2.2 euro cents per kilometre on 
an interurban roads, and 11.2 euro cents per kilometre on urban roads) and night-time (an 1.7 euro 
cent modif ier on rates between 7pm to 7am) differentiated charging would result in a 5.7% reduction 
in accidents but would also result in a 0.6% increase in travel times. The increase in travel times was 
estimated to occur due to a shift by drivers towards motorways, which are cheaper and safer, but 
could result in more congestion. 
In addition to the benef its to society mentioned above, more direct inf luences on individual insurance 
customers have also been estimated. Specif ically it is thought that if PAYD was implemented in the 
USA then the two thirds of households would benef it and be able to save approximately $270 USD per 
vehicle, per year (Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2011). This saving would benef it many lower income 
families in particular.
PAYD insurance would also impact on the insurance companies themselves. Again, information on 
the real world impacts of PAYD on insurance companies is not easily accessible due to commercial 
























would reduce loss ratios by 20%, primarily due to the safer driving of clients, a reduction in inaccurate 
or fraudulent claims, and the fact that GPS based PAYD insurance can also be helpful in theft prevention 
and vehicle recovery. Furthermore, a study looking at Progressive Insurance in the US concluded that 
PAYD insurance helped build closer customer ties between the insurance provider and clients via an 
increased sense of fairness, the provision of transparent prices, and an increased sense of security 
(Desyllas & Sako, 2012). It is also assumed that an attractive PAYD product, especially one that gets 
onto the market early, would attract customers that usually cannot afford insurance, occasional 
drivers that are well served by public transport, cautious drivers with ‘high risk’ aggregate prof iles 
(i.e. some young drivers), f leet owners, and people with young drivers or older parents that want 
the extra sense of security that comes with the monitoring of driver behaviour associated with PAYD 
insurance (Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Desyllas & Sako, 2012). The types of customers listed previously may 
even switch from other insurance companies in order to get the benef its of a good PAYD package, 
especially if the benef its of PAYD insurance are made clear to them via marketing messages. That PAYD 
insurance may be attractive to the parents of young drivers and to cautious young drivers themselves 
is important as young drivers have a high accident risk prof ile (OECD-ECMT, 2006b). Therefore, if 
PAYD insurance can help young drivers learn to drive safely it may help form habits that last a lifetime. 
However, if this is the case it is crucial that young drivers are enrolled in a PAYD insurance program 
while they are learning and during the f irst 6 months that they begin to drive solo. This is important as 
this f irst 6 months is the time at which young drivers are most likely to be involved in an accident and 
is also likely a time of intense learning and habit formation (Groeger, 2006; Lewis-Evans, 2010; OECD-
ECMT, 2006b). 
The estimates of the impact of PAYD on insurance companies are not all positive. As mentioned 
previously it is estimated that two thirds of insurance customers in the US would be better off under 
a mileage based PAYD system (Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2011). This means they would be paying 
less, which also means that insurance companies in general would be taking in less money. In fact, 
Bordoff & Noel (2008) estimate that under a best case scenario mileage based PAYD would only save 
insurance companies $34 USD a year per vehicle that switched. Adkins (2004) has also estimated the 
impact of PAYD on insurance companies and concluded that the introduction of PAYD would inevitably 
lead to drops in prof its and that it would also hurt the investment strategies of insurance companies 
due to them no longer being able to rely on the steady and predictable income f low that is associated 
with traditional car insurance. Furthermore, since it is likely that high mileage and high risk customers 
will stay on f lat rate insurance. The claim costs for traditional insurance may increase. This could 
be compensated by increasing the cost of f lat rate insurance, further incentivising a move to PAYD 
insurance; however, it may also hurt insurance companies, at least in the short term. Finally, the setup 
and maintenance of the infrastructure for PAYD insurance, particularly if it is GPS monitoring based, is 
a considerable cost that would have to be taken into account and met by insurance companies. Given 
these costs to insurance companies and the large potential social benef its of PAYD insurance in accident 
reduction, environmental protection, and road congestion there are calls by advocates of PAYD for 
Governments to step in to help insurance companies with the costs outlined above (Adkins, 2004; 
Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2005a; Litman, 2011). 
The above estimates of the costs and benef its of PAYD have generally been produced by economists 
and transport planners who make assumptions about how reactive drivers will be to hypothetical PAYD 
insurance systems. It is, however, also useful to look at large on-road studies that have assessed PAYD 
insurance systems and see what behavioural changes have occurred. One such study was carried out 
in the Netherlands by Bolderdijk, Knockaert, Steg & Verhoef (2011) who found no impact of PAYD on 
the mileage of drivers. This is not good news for mileage focused PAYD insurance. However, in the case 
of the Bolderdijk, et al (2011) study the lack of effect can possibly be explained by the fact that the PAYD 
insurance system used was not a standard mileage based one. In fact, the majority of the emphasis 
of the PAYD system was put on reducing speeding behaviour with 30 euro of the potential 50 euro 
incentive being assigned to rewarding keeping to the speed limit and only 15 euro able to be gained 
through reducing mileage. Since speeding behaviour is more directly and immediately under drivers 
























therefore avoided the relatively more diff icult task of adjusting their mileage. The end result was about 
a 4% reduction in the amount of time spent voluntary speeding. This reduction in speeding may sound 
small but it is in fact quite signif icant with the OCED/EMCT (2006a) estimating that as small as a 5% 
reduction in speeding in the driving population could decrease fatal accidents by 20%. A similar ‘Pay-As-
You-Speed’ system was also examined in Australia and resulted in a reduction in mileage of 10% and a 
4.7% reduction in the proportion of distance spent speeding (Greaves & Fifer, 2011). However, it should 
be noted that in the case of the Greaves and Fifer (2011) study the potential f inancial gains were higher 
than those in the Bolderdijk et al. (2011) study, with an average pay out to participants of $116 AUD. 
Also in the case of the Greaves and Fifer (2011) study speeding was used as a modif ier that changed 
the baseline price per kilometre travelled rather than being a separate incentive. Treating speeding as 
a modif ier on top of the normal mileage based charge may have made drivers more sensitive to their 
mileage than in the Bolderijk et al. (2011) study. 
The Belonitor trial, which was carried out in the Netherlands, is another example of a behaviour based 
PAYD system (Mazureck & van Hattem, 2006). The Belonitor system rewarded drivers if they stayed 
under the speed limit and did not follow cars in front of them too closely. Feedback on which was 
provided to the drivers via the in-car interface shown in f igure 2.1 
Figure 2.1 The in-car interface used in Mazureck & van Hattem (2006) to provide feedback on close 
following and speeding.
In the Belonitor study points were awarded with a trade-in value of between 0.04 and 0.01 euro per 
point and had to be checked via a website. Points were only awarded if both speed and following 
behaviour was appropriate (below the speed limit and more than 1.3 seconds behind a lead vehicle) 
and were given at a rate of one point per 15 seconds. There was also a chance to win an overall 
500 euros prize. The results of the study were that there was a signif icant increase in the proportion 
of kilometres spent driving under the speed limit, from 68% to 86%, along with an increase in the 
kilometres spent following vehicles at greater than 1.3 seconds head way, from 58% to 77%. Based on 
these results Mazureck & van Hattem (2006) estimated that if all vehicles in the Netherlands had a 
Belonitor system road accident fatalities would decrease by 15% and injuries by 9%. 
The three studies above are alterations to the basic mileage based Pay-As-You-Drive insurance 
formula. In contrast, research by Buxbaum (2006) looked at a traditional mileage based PAYD 
insurance system in the USA. Buxbaum (2006) examined a PAYD system that involved drivers attaching 
a device to their vehicle that would then record their driving behaviour. Then once the device was 
returned the data on their mileage could be used to calculate how much their driving would cost 
them. The overall result of this trial was a 4.4% reduction in mileage, with an 8.1% reduction in trips 
on the weekend and a 6.6% reduction in weekday peak time mileage. However, some drivers in the 
study actually increased their mileage during the PAYD insurance period. These individuals tended to 
live in areas without public transport options, had only one vehicle in their household, had a college-
graduate or post-graduate as the head of their house, and shared the PAYD vehicle between one or 
more household members which made it harder for them to co-ordinate its use. Conversely, those who 
did decrease their mileage tended to have leased vehicles, meaning they might be used to monitoring 
mileage already, had household members who ‘actively think about car ownership’, and also tended to 
have another vehicle in the household that could be used instead of the one that had PAYD installed. 
























study and means that its results should be interpreted with care. 
While it is always preferable to get data from on-road behavioural results, such as those reported 
above, rather than estimates it should be noted that there is one major limitation to the experimental 
studies mentioned. In all three cases, due to ethical concerns and the need to recruit participants, the 
participants could only loose a potential reward based on their driving and once this reward was gone 
they were not charged for any subsequent driving. Under a real PAYD insurance system participants 
would be rewarded for good behaviour, however this would tend to take the form of a reduction in the 
amount they still had to pay, meaning that there would always still be a cost to the driver. Therefore, 
the fact that the participants in these experiments never actually had to pay anything for their driving 
behaviour no matter how they drove may have lessened the impact of the PAYD intervention. That 
participants in experiments cannot be charged is a somewhat unavoidable aspect of experimental 
research due to ethical concerns and highlights the need for evaluations of commercial PAYD insurance 
products.
One f inal thing should be mentioned in terms of a potential impact of PAYD insurance and that is the 
potential for negative behavioural adaptation and technological over reliance (OECD, 1990). Negative 
behavioural adaptation is when people respond to a new technology or intervention in a way that is 
against or opposite to what is intended, and in the case of road safety negative behaviour adaptation 
may reduce or remove safety benef its of interventions (Carsten, 2009; Fuller, 1984; Näätänen & 
Summala, 1974; OECD, 1990; Vaa, 2007; Wilde, 1976). So, for example if a road is widened people may 
speed up when driving on it, therefore reducing the safety effects of the wider road (Lewis-Evans 
& Charlton, 2006). One type of negative behavioural adaptation that is likely to occur with PAYD 
insurance, particularly if it is in-car feedback based, is technological over-reliance, also known as 
complacency (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).This is where people accept a new technology and come 
to rely on it too much meaning that if it fails or provides incorrect information there may be negative 
outcomes (e.g. Rudin-Brown & Parker, 2004). So, for example if a car had a forward collision warning 
people may start driving closer to the cars in front of them, relying on the system to warn them if 
anything goes wrong. Another example would be blindly trusting a GPS system and ending up lost 
or trying to turn into a road that does not exist. At this time, however, there is no indication of such 
negative behavioural adaptation to PAYD insurance that we are aware of. But, it is always a risk and 
care should be taken to detect it, and correct it, if it occurs. 
2.2 Privacy concerns and the acceptance of PAYD insurance
One impact of PAYD insurance that is not mentioned in Section 2.1 is its impact on privacy. Telematics 
based PAYD insurance in particular has a large potential impact on privacy as it involves the monitoring 
of when, where, and how vehicles are being used. However, all PAYD insurance requires that a certain 
amount of private information is monitored, and indeed that this behaviour is being monitored is part 
of what is expected to produce behaviour change (Bolderdijk et al., 2011). However, at the same time 
consumers may feel that their privacy is being invaded and therefore may not wish to engage with 
PAYD insurance (Bolderdijk, Steg, & Postmes, 2012; Ogden, 2001; Schlag & Teubel, 1997; Schlag & Teubel, 
1997; Zweig & Webster, 2002). 
The problem of PAYD insurance and privacy can be illustrated via the history of telematics based PAYD 
insurance at the US insurance company Progressive. Their f irst telematics PAYD insurance package was 
the ‘Autograph’ system that was introduced by in 1998 and was eventually discontinued because of its 
high cost but also in part because customers saw the tracking system as an invasion of their privacy 
(Desyllas & Sako, 2012). Progressive then started offering the ‘Trip-sense’ PAYD product in 2003. ‘Trip-
sense’ was based on a device that was plugged into the vehicle and had to be manually uploaded in 
order to share the data the device had collected. Also, data on where a customer had been driving 
was not collected as it had been with the ‘Autograph’ system. The lack of location data and the choice 































However, in 2009 Progressive replaced ‘Trip-sense’ with the ‘MyRate’ product. ‘MyRate’ returned to 
the constant monitoring and transmission of driver data that had been present with ‘Autograph’. 
It appears that the live transmission of data again increased privacy concerns and more recently, in 
2010, the ‘Snapshot’ system replaced ‘MyRate’. The ‘Snapshot’ system monitors a driver’s behaviour 
via a device plugged into a car’s diagnostic port. This data is wirelessly transmitted to Progressive and 
tracks mileage, fast acceleration, hard braking, cornering, and the time of day. The ‘Snapshot’ system 
is initially used for 30 days to give up to a 30% discount on the next 6-months of insurance costs. After 
6-months the data from ‘Snapshot’ is again used to change this discount amount. Privacy concerns 
about ‘Snapshot’ have been reported as lower than ‘MyRate’ by Desyllas & Sako (2012), and this could 
be related to no longer collecting data on speed or to the time-period based assessment method. 
Progressive also provides clear data guidance that all information collected is on a voluntary basis 
and will never be passed on to the police or the government. However, it may also be that attitudes 
towards privacy are changing over time and that people have become more trusting and accepting 
of the privacy trade-offs required by many modern technologies (Bolderdijk, Steg, & Postmes, 2012; 
Buxbaum, 2006).
Given the above, privacy is an issue that any insurance provider or any government looking to 
encourage, or institute compulsory, PAYD insurance should consider. In relation to the privacy issue, 
research has suggested that if people perceive that they will gain a benef it by giving up information 
that would otherwise be private then they are much less reluctant to do so (Bolderdijk, Steg, & 
Postmes, 2012). This applies generally, but the Bolderdijk, Steg, & Postmes (2012) study also included one 
experiment (experiment 2) that focused on privacy concerns related to a hypothetical PAYD insurance 
product. In this experiment, 23 participants read a positive assessment of PAYD insurance which told 
them that:
“The less you drive, the less likely it is that you will be involved in an accident, and the more 
you save on your premium.” Additionally, participants in the positive policy consequences 
condition read, “Imagine that over the course of a year, you’ve reduced your mileage by 
20%. This means you would save €200 on your insurance premium.” (Bolderdijk, Steg, & 
Postmes, 2012, pg 7)
Whereas, 27 participants read a more negative assessment of the impact of PAYD insurance and which 
told them that:
“The more you drive, the more likely it is that you will be involved in an accident, and the 
more additional premium you have to pay.”… Additionally, participants in the negative 
consequences condition read, “Imagine that, over the course of a year, you’ve increased 
your mileage by 20%. This means you would have to pay an additional insurance premium of 
€ 200.” (Bolderdijk, Steg, & Postmes, 2012, pg 7)
Those participants who read the negatively framed assessment of PAYD insurance rated it signif icantly 
more concerning in terms of privacy (with an average rating of 4.52 out of 7) than those who read the 
positively framed assessment (with an average rating of 3.31 out of 7). So, given that mileage based 
PAYD insurance is estimated to benef it approximately two-thirds of drivers (Bordoff & Noel, 2008; 
Litman, 2011), privacy may only be a large issue for the third of consumers who would not benef it 
under such a system. However, in the case of voluntary PAYD insurance such non-benef iting customers 
would probably not be attracted to PAYD insurance in the f irst place. Nor would they necessarily 
stick with such a system once they f ind out that they are not benef iting. An initial, obligation free, trial 
period for a PAYD insurance product, such as that used by the ‘MyRate’ package (Desyllas & Sako, 
2012) would likely help customers determine if they will benef it or not from PAYD and therefore lesson 
privacy concerns. Along with having the added value of demonstrating the benef it of PAYD to those 
who would gain from such a system. Evidence that a trial period of PAYD insurance can reduce privacy 































experienced PAYD insurance were signif icantly more accepting of the technology and less concerned 
about their privacy than those in the control group who had not experienced PAYD insurance. This 
effect, where experience with a new product, technology, or policy increases acceptance for it, is well 
known (for example see Schuitema, 2010) and highlights the importance of trial periods, as well as the 
fact that care should be taken when making decisions about not implementing a new technology just 
because acceptance levels amongst those who have not tried it yet appears to be initially low. 
In terms of a voluntary PAYD insurance program it should be remembered that many of the estimates 
of the large societal benef its associated with mileage based PAYD insurance do assume that people 
who do not benef it from PAYD are still having their behaviour affected by PAYD (Adkins, 2004; Bordoff 
& Noel, 2008; Litman, 2005a; Litman, 2005b; Litman, 2011; Zantema et al., 2008). This means that if 
it is easy for those who do not benef it to remove themselves from PAYD insurance systems then the 
impact of PAYD on society is likely to be reduced. For example, a previously mentioned study in the 
Netherlands estimated that the impact of voluntary mileage based PAYD insurance (where non-
benef iting drivers would presumably not sign-up), with modif iers for type of road and time of day, 
would reduce accidents by 2.5%. Whereas compulsory government mandated PAYD would more than 
double the benef its and reduce accidents by 5.7% (Zantema et al., 2008).
The privacy concerns that individuals may have about PAYD insurance are also likely to depend on 
how the insurance is structured. For instance is it a system where drivers can actually end up paying 
more than they currently do? Or does the system only use driver behaviour to calculate a discount 
that is then applied to a set price for insurance, meaning that drivers would not have to pay over a 
set maximum? This latter, discount only, version of PAYD may be more acceptable to customers as 
it creates an impression that there is only benef it to be had. Although it is not known if this discount 
approach would have a greater or lesser impact on driver behaviour than has been previously 
estimated, as these previous estimates have the assumption that insurance costs are directly tied to 
mileage (Adkins, 2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2005a; Litman, 2005b; Litman, 2011; Zantema 
et al., 2008). A discount based PAYD system would also allow for more accurate estimating of future 
revenue streams by insurance companies as they would always be able to guarantee a set minimal 
amount of payment from customers. That an insurance company could use this information to better 
estimate income would then also reduce the potential negative fanatical impacts of PAYD (Adkins, 2004; 
Bordoff & Noel, 2008). 
While privacy is obviously important for the acceptance of PAYD insurance there are also likely 
other factors that will impact on whether it is attractive to drivers. These could range from purely 
a cost-benef it analysis to the impacts how the data on their driving behaviour is presented to them. 
While, to the best of our knowledge, these specif ic factors have not been publically investigated, 
a couple of studies have examined the general acceptance of PAYD insurance. Bordoff and Noel 
(2008) for example state that 9 out of 10 people who answered a survey in the UK would prefer 
that their insurance was ref lective of the way that they used their car and the journeys that they 
made. Furthermore, of those surveyed, half of them favoured a PAYD insurance plan where you pay 
every month based on your car usage like a gas or electricity bill. Another study, carried out in the 
Netherlands, used a stated preference design and found that for a monthly reward of around 7-8 euros 
that 27% of the participants indicated that they would be willing to try PAYD insurance. Interestingly 
this f igure of around 27% did not really change along with increases in the potential reward amount. 
Rather, the best predictors of interest in PAYD insurance seemed to be if people were unhappy with 
their current insurance or if they liked the idea of PAYD insurance. There was also a slight bias in female 
respondents towards favouring PAYD insurance (Knoop, Li, & van Arem, 2011). This 27% f igure matches 
well with the fact that Progressive insurance, mentioned above, also had around 34% its customers in 































2.3 Types of PAYD insurance and examples
There are several forms of PAYD insurance. The f irst is perhaps the most simple and can be compared 
to a pre-pay cell phone contract. Under this most basic PAYD system customers pre-purchase insurance 
based on their expected mileage for a period (for example a year) and then are assessed at the end 
of that period and either reimbursed or charged extra if they have exceeded the previously agreed 
upon mileage. The mileage checks and reporting can be carried out either by the individual drivers, 
which carries with it a higher risk of fraud, or via independent assessment of odometers or in-car 
monitoring devices. Such a pre-paid system could also be conf igured so that drivers could ‘top up’ their 
mileage limits as they exceeded them. One such system is being operated by Real Insurance in Australia 
(Litman, 2011). Pre-paid mileage systems are limited in terms of a relatively high possibility of fraud and 
that they are only sensitive to how much the customer has driven and not necessarily where, when, 
and how they drove. 
The next PAYD insurance variation is similar to the above but rather than prepaying for mileage 
customers are regularly assessed. Again this assessment can occur by themselves, by external assessors, 
or via technology (i.e. devices that collect mileage and are regularly uploaded or sent back to the 
insurance company), and then charged based on their current car usage. This form of PAYD insurance 
involves less of an up-front payment to the insurance company and provides a greater and more 
immediate level of feedback on the cost of their driving which may lead them to be more sensitive to 
these costs and change their behaviour more rapidly than the pre-paid method of consumption (Adkins, 
2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2005a; Litman, 2005b; Litman, 2011; Mazureck & van Hattem, 2006; 
Skinner, 1974; Zantema et al., 2008). If monitored via technology, this type of approach also allows for 
information like where and when the customer was driving to be taken into account and factored into 
PAYD charges. 
The rate of feedback to the driver can then be further enhanced via constant monitoring PAYD 
systems. Such systems rely on in car technology, such as a GPS system, to monitor driver behaviour 
and send this information in real time back to the insurance company. This not only allows for how 
much, when, and where driving occurs to be taken into account in PAYD insurance charges, but also 
opens the possibility for driver behaviour to be monitored and priced. Furthermore, in car technology 
gives added value to drivers in terms of also being able to be linked to ‘black box’ type functions in the 
case of an accident and to anti-theft or vehicle recovery measures. This type of constant monitoring 
system also opens the possibility for detailed information to be feedback to drivers either in real time 
in the car or at a later date via a the internet or postal service. Constant monitoring is also the most 
expensive option but is predicted to have the greatest benef it due to being able to more accurately 
ref lect rewards for good driving behaviour and the general responsiveness of humans to more direct 
monitoring and feedback (Lattal, 2010; Renner, 1964; Thorndike, 1911; Watson, 1917). 
As mentioned in the section on privacy (Section 2.2), one option for PAYD insurance is to use the data 
collected to offer a discount off a future lump sum insurance payment rather than setting the insurance 
directly via a mechanism such as being charged a certain amount per unit travelled. This creates the 
impression that the customer is earning or losing a discount and also reassures customers that their 
driving behaviour will never be used to charge them more than the standard f lat rate. Such a discount 
approach could be used with any of the types of PAYD insurance discussed above. 
Several companies around the world already offer PAYD insurance packages of varying types. Below 
are a few examples:
Allstate (USA) 
http://www.allstate.com/drive-wise.aspx
Allstate offer the ‘Drive Wise’ system which is a telematics option that records mileage, speeding, 
night-time driving (between 11pm and 4am weekdays and 11pm to 5am weekends) and braking 
behaviour. The data collected by ‘Drive Wise’ is then used to calculate a discount on insurance 






























their progress and get feedback on their driving via a web interface. 
American Family Mutual Insurance (USA) 
http://www.amfam.com/microsites/teen-safe-driver/default.asp
The ‘Teen Safe’ driver package is a young driver behaviour based PAYD system. It monitors young 





This is a behaviour based telematics PAYD package aimed at young drivers. It monitors their 
braking, acceleration, cornering, speeding and the time of day at which they drive. The behavioural 
data is then used to provide ‘safe driver’ discounts and feedback to drivers via a web interface (see 
f igure 1.2).
Figure 2.2 Co-operative insurance’s driver feedback web interface.
GMAC insurance (USA)
https://www.gmacinsurance.com/auto-insurance/smart-discounts/low-mileage-discount.asp
A ‘Pay-As-You-Go’1 mileage based PAYD insurance system that uses GPS technology to provide a 
discount on a f lat rate insurance bill based on how many miles a customer drives. This mileage is 
conf irmed via a telematics system. However, no other data is collected. That no additional data is 
collected is presented by GMAC as a selling point. 
iKube (UK)
http://www.ikubeinsurance.com/
‘iKube’ is a young driver focused product and the company claims they are a specialist in ‘learner 
driver insurance’. They offer variety of telematics based insurances. All of which appear to offer the 
ability for young drivers to earn ‘cheaper premiums’ by not driving between 11pm – 5am. They also 
promote that they ‘… won’t charge you per mile, unlike other providers’.
1 It is worth noting that in the USA both ‘Pay-As-You-Drive’ and ‘PAYD’ are trademarks of the Progressive insurance company. This means that other 
companies in the USA must use different terms for their packages. However, Progressive was denied this trademark (and its associated patents) in Europe 
































Ingenie offers ‘black box’ insurance to young drivers. This insurance package uses telematics to 
collect data on acceleration, braking, speed, cornering, and swerving. This data is then feedback 
to drivers via the web or an app and used it to calculate a discount on insurance costs based on a 
renewal every 3 months. Ingenie do not charge by the mile and do not take time of day of driving 
into account. Indeed, they use the fact they do not have any ‘curfew’s’ in their marketing material.
Insure the Box (UK)
http://www.insurethebox.com/
‘Insure the box’ markets itself as ‘The UK’s leading telematics insurer’. Their system f irst involves 
drivers pre-purchasing either 6,000 or 8,000 miles. Each driver’s mileage is then tracked via an in-
car system and drivers can then ‘top-up’ these miles at any time by purchasing more. In addition 
to this pre-paid mileage, driver behaviour is tracked and they can earn ‘bonus’ miles (up to 100 
miles per month) as well as receiving a discount at the time of next insurance renewal. It is not 
exactly clear how bonus miles and this discount are earned, but they seem to be based on the 
monitoring of; time of day, speed by road type, smoothness of driving, taking breaks on long 
journeys, type of road driven, number of journey’s made, and the details of any accidents. It is also 
possible for drivers to view information on their driving online and get ‘reward miles’ by shopping 
online with retailers that are associated with ‘Insure the Box’. ‘Insure the box’ also heavily promote 
themselves as offering ‘incentives not penalties’ and that they have ‘no curfews or f ines’. In addition 
to the PAYD insurance package ‘Insure the Box’ also uses their telematics system to offer car theft 
recovery and automatic accident reporting. 
Liberty Mutual (USA) 
https://www.onboardadvisor.com/
The ‘Onboard Advisor’ product is telematics based and focused on f leet owners. It provides 
discounts and along with web and mobile application based analysis and feedback on what it calls 
‘driving style’ and speeding behaviours.
Progressive insurance (USA)
http://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshot.aspx
Progressive are pioneers in PAYD insurance and their latest package is called ‘Snapshot’ (Desyllas 
& Sako, 2012). The snapshot system uses a telematics device that is plugged into a cars diagnostic 
port and provides a discount based on drivers braking behaviour, mileage, and their frequency of 




An odometer check based pre-paid PAYD insurance system where customers can pre-buy mileage 
at any time. This includes the ability to ‘top up’ their mileage allowance if they exceed it. 
Statefarm (USA)
http://www.statefarm.com/insurance/auto_insurance/drive-safe-save/drive-safe-save.asp
The ‘Drive safe and save’ product uses telematics based information on mileage and acceleration 
data to provide a discount on insurance. This is based on driver behaviour collected over 6 months 
of driving that is then used to set a discount on insurance for the next insurance policy period.
Teensurance (USA)
https://www.teensurance.com/
While not strictly a PAYD insurance product, ‘SafeCo’ from Teensurance demonstrates young driver 






























the system provides feedback and alerts to parents on their young drivers behaviour. This includes 
speed limit monitoring, location tracking, the setting up of ‘safe driving zones’ that will alert parents 
if deviated from, arrival and departure notif ications, and the ability to set and be notif ied of driving 
curfews. The ‘SafeCo’ system also offers location tracking and assistance in the case of an accident 
or break down.
2.4 PAYD insurance variations
As the examples given in section 2.3 show, PAYD insurance comes in many forms and in some cases 
does not even include the traditionally assessed mileage aspect of PAYD. This may in part be because 
Progressive insurance in the US has several patents on PAYD technology, which may have discouraged 
competition and led to a need to differentiate any potential PAYD product in the US market (Bordoff 
& Noel, 2008; Desyllas & Sako, 2012). However, it also highlights the potential for PAYD insurance to 
be more than just a mileage charge. In fact, it appears that Pay-As-You-Drive can be interpreted to be 
Pay-How-When-and-Where-You-Drive or nearly any combination of these factors. 
A common measure of driver behaviour in behaviour based PAYD insurance systems is acceleration. 
For example, the Co-operative Insurance, ‘Drive safe and save’, ‘Drive-wise’, ‘Ingenie’, ‘Insure the box’, 
‘Onboard Advisor’, and ‘Snapshot’ products described above all use some measure of acceleration 
in setting their premiums or changing the discount provided to drivers. Specif ically, these insurance 
products assess rapid accelerations, sharp braking, and cornering behaviour. This is in part due to the 
ease of collecting this type of data via telematics. However, it is also due to the assumption that rapid 
changes in acceleration results from less smooth and more reactive driving, which may imply that a 
driver is driving aggressively and not anticipating or paying enough attention to their surroundings (Af 
Wåhlberg, 2008). Furthermore, rapid changes in acceleration and heavy braking are associated with 
heavy fuel consumption and environmental impacts (Barkenbus, 2010). For example rapid accelerations 
and decelerations (over 1.5 m/s2) can have signif icant impacts on emissions and fuel consumption 
(Larsson & Ericsson, 2009). Therefore, feedback on acceleration behaviour, such as the feedback that 
could be built into a PAYD insurance system, particularly if delivered in car, has been shown to be able 
to decrease fuel consumption by 10% (Barkenbus, 2010). Ten percent is quite a signif icant reduction 
in fuel consumption and if taken across the whole US vehicle f leet it would result in an estimated 
reduction of CO2 emissions by nearly 100 metric tons. 
Pay-As-You-Speed is another variant of PAYD insurance that has been investigated. In this variant a 
charge for exceeding the speed limit is added in addition to, or instead of a mileage based charge. As 
mentioned previously, the studies by Greaves & Fifer (2011) and Bolderdijk, et al (2011) both found that 
detecting and charging drivers for speeding can result in signif icant reductions in speeding. Similarly, the 
study by Mazureck & van Hattern (2006) found that speeding could be reduced by as much as 20% 
based on providing a reward ranging between 0.01 and 0.04 euros per 15 seconds spent not speeding 
in combination with constant in-car feedback on driver behaviour and the amount of reward earned. 
PAYD insurance that is based on risky on-road behaviour therefore offers a great opportunity to 
correct the fact that rewards for good behaviour while driving are rare whereas the rewards for risky 
behaviour are common and the consequences of running risks are rarely felt (Fuller, 1984; Näätänen & 
Summala, 1974; Rothengatter, 1988). Since this opportunity to provide feedback and rewards is one of 
the major features of PAYD insurance it will be discussed in more depth in Section 3 of this report.
2.4.1 Intelligent Speed Adaptation
Before moving on it is worth discussing one speed related in-car feedback device that has been well 
researched and could be easily added to a PAYD insurance package. Perhaps even just as an optional 
extra. That technology is Intelligent Speed Adaptation, also known as intelligent speed assistance or 






































speed limit (Carsten & Tate, 2005; Regan, Young, & Haworth, 2003). However, the form that is of most 
interest in reference to PAYD insurance is an advisory system. An advisory ISA system simply displays 
the current speed limit on an in-vehicle device, which is usually set via an inbuilt GPS map such as those 
that may be already associated with a PAYD system (Litman, 2011; Regan et al., 2003). Then, if the 
speed limit is exceeded by a certain amount, the ISA provides an alert or reminder to the driver. The 
driving force behind such ISA systems being that a signif icant proportion of speeding is assumed to be 
due to habit and may therefore be performed unintentionally due to missed signs or mixed signals from 
the road environment (e.g. Charlton, 2006; de Waard, Jessurun, Steyvers, Regatt, & Brookhuis, 1995; 
Lewis-Evans, de Waard, & Brookhuis, 2011). It is therefore assumed that reminding a driver of the speed 
limit would decrease unintentional speeding and perhaps lead to the formation of newer, safer, driving 
habits. Such speed reminder systems are built into many commercial GPS products already.
In experimental trials, many of which have been conducted both in large scale and on-road, advisory 
ISA has been shown to signif icantly decrease speeding, along with reductions in the variability of 
speed and in fuel consumption in some instances (e.g. Brookhuis & de Waard, 1999; Lahrmann et al., 
2011; Päätalo et al., 2002; Sundberg, 1999). Such advisory ISA systems have been reported to decrease 
average driving speed by as much as 5 km/h, an amount that could result in a 20% decrease in 
fatal accidents (OECD-ECMT, 2006a). Furthermore, it has been estimated that if widely adopted, or 
mandated, even the most basic form of advisory ISA system would decrease injury crashes by 10% and 
fatal crashes by 18% UK (Carsten & Tate, 2005). 
The addition of speed monitoring to a PAYD system, even if just in the form of a simple advisory 
system, but especially if it was tied to charges or loss of a bonus in a PAYD insurance system, could risk 
lowering acceptance for such PAYD. This would likely be due to a negative association in consumers 
between speed monitoring and traditional speed enforcement and a fear that speed data could be 
passed on to authorities. On the other hand, the introduction to speed monitoring via PAYD insurance, 
where the penalties for speeding would be less than those levelled by traditional enforcement and 
where people could be rewarded for sticking to the speed limit could help reduce the stigma that 
is sometimes associated with speed enforcement. In fact initial acceptance for advisory ISA is often 
relatively high, with approval rates above 50% (Brookhuis & de Waard, 1999). Also, much like for PAYD 
insurance (e.g. Buxbaum, 2006) acceptance for advisory ISA also tends to increase once it has been 
experienced by drivers, with as many as 70-90% of the participants in an Swedish ISA trial saying that 
advisory ISA was useful to them after they had tried it (Biding & Lind, 2002). ISA also has the potential 
to save users from receiving f ines that they would have got otherwise due to their non-intentional 
speeding behaviour, a point that could be used in marketing to increase acceptance for the technology. 
An advisory ISA was combined with a Pay-As-You-Speed system in a study carried out in Denmark 
(Lahrmann et al., 2011). The study offered drivers up to a 30% discount off their insurance premium 
based on their speeding and in addition provided an advisory ISA system to give immediate feedback 
on both the discount they had earned and their speeding behaviour. The study was unfortunately 
ended prematurely due to a problem with recruiting participants (who at one point in the study had to 
pay to participate). However, the data they did manage to collect was promising in terms of showing 
reductions in the proportion of time spent 5 km/h or higher over the speed limit. The decrease in 
speeding was strongest for those participants who were in the Pay-As-You-Speed combined with in-car 
ISA condition. Interestingly, however, if just those in a Pay-As-You-Speed condition (with no ISA) were 
compared to those who only received ISA then advisory ISA had a stronger effect than Pay-As-You-
Speed alone. That just the provision of immediate, in-car, feedback was more effective than adding an 






































3. Rewards, penalties, 
and Feedback
Both economics and behavioural psychology rely on the correct use of incentives to motivate human 
behaviour (e.g. Gneezy et al., 2011; Lattal, 2010; Renner, 1964; Skinner, 1953; Thorndike, 1911; Watson, 
1917). That incentives motivate people is in fact so central to economics that Gneezy, Meir, and Rey-Biel 
(2011) state that the ‘economic law of behaviour’ is simply that giving higher, positive, incentives will lead 
to more effort and higher performance. Radical behaviourism also concludes that all behaviour is driven 
by its consequences (Skinner, 1953; Skinner, 1974). 
Consequences, or incentives, can either be negative or positive and can be referred to as rewards 
(positive) or penalties (negative). Furthermore, within behavioural psychology a distinction is made 
between a positive consequence for a behaviour (a reward) and such a reward that increases the 
probability of the behaviour occurring again in the future, which is called a reinforcement (Cameron & 
Pierce, 1994; Cameron et al., 2001; Skinner, 1974). This means that a behaviour can result in a reward 
(a positive consequence) but only if this reward leads to an increase in the probability of this behaviour 
occurring again can the reward be considered a reinforcement. Similarly there is a distinction between 
a negative consequence for a behaviour (a penalty or loss) and a negative consequence that decreases 
the probability of the behaviour occurring again in the future, which is called a punishment (Skinner, 
1974). The distinction between a reward and a reinforcer, or a penalty and a punishment, is ultimately 
a circular one. In that a reward can only be called a reinforcer if it is shown at a later date to increase 
the probability of a behaviour occurring again in the future. Similarly a penalty can only be called a 
punishment, in behavioural terms, if the penalty decreases the probability of a behaviour occurring 
again in the future (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Cameron et al., 2001). It is still worth pointing out that 
just because a positive or negative consequence occurs in the form of a reward or penalty it does 
not mean that behaviour will change. The rest of this section therefore looks at how to best provide 
rewards, penalties, and feedback on these consequences to individuals in order to produce behaviour 
change. 
3.1 How to effectively deliver rewards and penalties
In order to increase the chance that a reward does become a reinforcer, or a penalty becomes a 
punishment, there are a few points that need to be considered. First of all the two most important 
factors are that the reward or penalty is as closely and clearly associated with the behaviour that is 
to be targeted as possible (Skinner, 1974). This means that the reward or penalty should, in terms of 
time, follow as closely as possible to the time at which the behaviour occurs. It should also be clear 
exactly what behaviour caused the reward or penalty to be received. In other words, performing the 
behaviour must reliably predict the receiving of a reward or penalty within a short time frame. The 
idea is that this then gives important feedback to the person receiving the consequence and lets them 
clearly link it to the behaviour that they were performing. Therefore, the longer the time between the 
behaviour and receiving a reward the less likely that the reward will become a reinforcer and therefore 
increase the chance that the behaviour will occur again in the future.
In the case of a penalty it is extremely important that this link between the behaviour and negative 
consequence is clear, strong, and as immediate as possible (Skinner, 1974). To do otherwise can breed 
additional resentment, feelings of fear, or a feeling of injustice as it becomes unclear when and if a 
particular behaviour will be punished. In this fashion the certainty of detection of a negative behaviour 
is considered to be of vital importance. This increase of the (perception of) the certainty of detection 
is one of the main driving forces behind the idea of automated speed enforcement via camera systems 
(Cameron, Delaney, Diamantopoulou, & Lough, 2003). 
Conversely, while it is important that a reward quickly follow the behaviour it is intended to encourage 
it is not necessarily the case that it must follow the behaviour every single time. When a behaviour 
is rewarded every single time it occurs or after a f ixed number of occurrences it is known as a 
f ixed schedule of reinforcement (Skinner, 1974). Fixed ratio schedules of reinforcement are good at 



































a behaviour and a positive consequence. This is because they very predictably link a behaviour, e.g. 
pressing down on the accelerator quickly, with a positive consequence, e.g. a pleasurable feeling of 
acceleration. However, f ixed ratio schedules of reinforcement have two downsides. One is that after 
the reward is delivered there tends to be a pause, or stop, in the behaviour that has been rewarded. 
This can be viewed as occurring because the person has just got the reward and knows that they can 
easily get another by responding again the required amount of times. The other disadvantage is that 
once the f ixed ratio reward is removed the behaviour it is associated with also usually quickly stops. 
That the behaviour stops quickly when the reward is removed is due to the predictable link between 
the reward and the behaviour, so when the reward stops coming a clear signal is sent that the 
behaviour is also not as important or needed. Fixed ratios are therefore somewhat poor at forming 
habits that will continue once the reward has been removed. 
On the other hand, if a reward is received after a variable number of times, e.g. only the 10th time 
on average that you perform the behaviour, this is called a variable ratio schedule of reinforcement 
(Skinner, 1974). Variable ratios, due to their somewhat more unpredictable rate of reward result in 
even higher rates of responding than f ixed ratio schedules because while the person knows a reward 
is coming, they do not know when. Also because past experience has taught the individual that 
reward will come eventually if they just keep trying a variable reinforcement schedule also tends to 
lead to behaviour that is more likely to form a long lasting habit. A classic example of a variable ratio 
reinforcement schedule is that used by a jackpot gambling machine in a casino. 
The fact that the certainty and swiftness of a reward or penalty are so important highlights the need 
for feedback. Specif ically it highlights the importance of immediate feedback on behaviour. Feedback 
also offers the opportunity to communicate information immediately about a reward that may actually 
be delivered later, e.g. progress towards a reduction in insurance premiums. In this case the feedback 
is a medium that replaces the actual reward and it has been shown that much like how money is 
traded for goods, the medium can be as motivating or more so, than the actual reward (Bagchi & Li, 
2011; Hsee et al., 2003). That immediate, continuous, feedback is more effective than delayed feedback 
is highlighted in a study by Van Houwelingen & Van Raaij (1989) that looked at providing feedback to 
households on their energy use. It was found that those who received continuous, immediate, feedback 
on their use of gas saved signif icantly more (a 12.3% reduction in gas use) than those who were given 
monthly (a 7.7% reduction in gas use) feedback. Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 2.4.1, a Demark 
based Pay-As-You-Speed and advisory ISA study found that immediate feedback by itself (i.e. just the 
ISA system) produced more of a reduction in the proportion of time spent speeding than simply the 
addition of a delayed reward (Lahrmann et al., 2011). However, the combination of immediate feedback 
on the reward and the advisory ISA had the largest effect. 
The preference that people have for immediate rewards, even if they are smaller than more delayed 
rewards, is referred to as reward discounting and is in some senses biological (Hariri et al., 2006). 
Specif ically, ventral striatal brain activity is considered to be related to the anticipation and processing 
of rewards. Neurological studies have found that small, yet immediate rewards lead to increases in 
ventral striatal activity in the brain when compared to larger delayed rewards (Hariri et al., 2006; 
McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). Immediate rewards also seem to increase the activity 
in the medial prefrontal cortex and orbitofrontal cortex, both of which are associated with decision 
making and particularly with risky decision making (McClure et al., 2004). Therefore, it appears that 
humans are biologically predisposed to prefer immediate rewards, a predisposition that a good in-car 
feedback system associated with PAYD insurance could take advantage of. 
The f inal aspect related to whether a reward or penalty becomes a reinforcer or punishment is the size 
(or severity) of the reward/penalty. Simply speaking, the reward or penalty must be large enough that 
it motivates the person receiving it (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Skinner, 1974). The size or severity of 
reward or penalty is, however, the least important factor in determining its effectiveness (Bjørnskau & 
Elvik, 1992; Skinner, 1974; Zaal, 1994). That the severity of a punishment is the least effective element is 



































device that detects the blood alcohol level of a driver every single time they enter the car and penalises 
them with the relatively low penalty of being unable to drive until they are sober or police enforcement 
that only detects, on average, a drunk driver once per 27,000 miles driven drunk (the chance of 
being detected for drunk driving in the US (Levitt & Porter, 2001), with a large and quite delayed 
consequence of jail time or a f ine? In the f irst case, the use of an alcohol interlock, detection is nearly 
guaranteed and therefore the driver cannot risk themselves or others, meanwhile all that the driver 
has lost is an opportunity to drive. In the last case the penalty for drunk driving is high yet the chance 
of detection is low, so is it any surprise that despite a tendency for increases in enforcement and the 
penalties for drink driving that alcohol related road accidents are still one of the most common causes 
of road deaths worldwide (World Health Organization, 2009). In fact, studies in Australia (Briscoe, 
2004) and the USA (Wagenaar et al., 2007) have reported that increasing the severity of a penalty 
associated with drunk driving, including doubling the normal jail time and penalties in the Australian 
example, has very little effect on drunk driving re-offending. 
An example that reward size is not the most crucial factor can be taken from the Belonitor trial in 
the Netherlands. This trial started off with a relatively low reward rate of 0.04 euros per 15 seconds 
performing the required behaviours. However, during the trial they reduced the reward to 0.01 euros 
per 15 seconds and found that this lower reward appeared to be just as effective (Mazureck & van 
Hattem, 2006). That there was no change in the Belonitor trial as the reward rate decreased is likely 
also linked to the fact that participants in the trial also had immediate in-car feedback on their driving 
behaviour and therefore had clear feedback on when they were and were not receiving the reward. 
Even if the size of a reward or penalty is generally considered to be the least important factor it is still 
something that must be considered. The economists Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) have particularly 
emphasised the effect of reward size. In a paper entitled “Pay enough or don’t pay at all” Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000) even claim to show that rewards that are low may in fact produce behaviour at lower 
rates than if people were not paid at all. However, many of their results were not statistically signif icant 
at the p < 0.05 level. Care should also be taken with large rewards, as Ariely, Gneezy, Lowenstein, and 
Mazar (2009) have suggested that rewards can be too high, which induces high mental workload and 
anxiety that can cause people to ‘choke’ or under perform.
One way to get around the potential problem of small rewards is to use a medium such as points that 
are earned and then traded off for a tangible reward. Such point based systems are used extensively 
in so called ‘loyalty’ programmes, such as air miles or in-store cards that offer points for purchases 
(Henderson, Beck, & Palmatier, 2011). Points can be varied in larger amounts than the underlying 
reward, i.e. it is easy to give 1,000 points for a behaviour but not so easy to give 1,000 euros, and 
people are sensitive and reactive to large numbers as they associate them with large sizes (Pelham, 
Sumarta, & Myaskovsky, 1994). This bias towards large numbers can also impact on individuals feelings 
of progress towards a reward. In that they will prefer a system where they gain 10 points per time unit 
in a system where they need 1,000 points to get a reward over a system where they get 1 point per 
time unit but only need 100 points to get a reward (Bagchi & Li, 2011). Furthermore there is evidence 
that people are relatively insensitive to the rate that points trade off to actual rewards. Meaning that 
people react to the amount and rate that they earn points and not to the underlying rate at which 
those points can be translated into rewards (Hsee et al., 2003; Van Osselaer, Alba, & Manchanda, 
2004). For instance in their 2003 study Hsee, Yu, Zhang and Zhang found that people were willing to 
listen to an aversive sound for longer if they received points in a linear fashion even if the trade off 
to the later reward of candies was non-linear (so points were actually worth less candies per point). 
Whereas if the medium of points were earned in a non-linear fashion but traded off linearly (so points 
were actually worth more candies per point) the participants did not listen to the aversive sound as 
long. In a similar fashion van Osselaer et al. (2004) found that people tend to pick air-points schemes 
that appeared to give the most points immediately, even if the way those points traded off into actual 



































3.2 Rewards or penalties?
Both rewards and penalties are aimed at the same goal, producing a desired behaviour or behaviours. 
But which is the most effective at achieving this goal? The answer from behavioural psychology is clear: 
rewards should be used and penalties should be avoided2 (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Gneezy et al., 2011; 
Lattal, 2010; Renner, 1964; Skinner, 1953; Skinner, 1974; Thorndike, 1911; Watson, 1917). The avoidance of 
penalties and punishments is advocated for several reasons. Firstly, as mentioned above penalties, more 
so than rewards, need to be delivered rapidly and certainly in order to be effective. In many practical 
situations this is diff icult to achieve due to the cost of monitoring, both in terms of money and time, and 
the fact that people will work to avoid being detected and punished. A consequence of people trying to 
avoid being detected is an increase in deception and a decrease in trust between those being penalised 
and those delivering the penalty. Related to this decrease in trust, penalties also tend to increase 
negative feelings in general towards the person or entity that is delivering a penalty. This can especially 
be the case if the application of penalties is viewed as being unfair due to low detection rates and a 
slow delivery of the eventual penalty. Finally, penalties only clearly communicate what should not be 
done. They do not, generally, inform the person that is being penalised as to what they should be doing 
instead. 
Rewards on the other hand communicate to the receiver that the behaviour they are doing is correct, 
or at least on the right track, and should be continued in the future. This informative element of 
rewards is a major advantage over the use of penalties as it communicates what should be done, and 
also in the case of performance dependent rewards, how well it should be done. Also, depending on 
how the reward is delivered, a reward could lead rewarded individuals to develop positive associations 
with the person or entity doing the rewarding. These positive associations do, however, depend on 
how the reward is distributed. If rewards are not handled or distributed well it is possible that the 
reception of rewards can be perceived as an attempt to manipulate or control and this may ref lect 
negatively upon the person or entity providing the reward (Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001). 
This raises the issue of rewards, penalties, and control. Ultimately, it is true that rewards and penalties 
are an attempt at control, and generally speaking people resist and resent being controlled (Deci et 
al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001). In fact, if people have an impression that they are being controlled, either by 
penalties or rewards, they may react by performing the opposite behaviour to that which is desired, 
this is called countercontrol (Skinner, 1972) or psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966). Similarly, feedback 
on performance can also be seen as controlling depending on how it is given and so may also lead to 
resentment or dissatisfaction in those who receive the feedback (Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001).
Therefore, in order to minimise the negative impacts of giving rewards or feedback it is important that 
feedback or rewards are given in a way that is neutral or non-judgemental and could not be taken 
as attempting to control an individual. It is also helpful if the reward or feedback can be tied directly 
to positive performance and provide information on what was done correctly (Ryan, 1982). So, for 
instance, feedback should read “You consistently drove under the speed limit in the last week and 
earned 300 points” rather than “It is expected that you should drive under the speed limit, you did so 
in the last week and earned 300 points.” In the second example, by making the driving under the speed 
limit an ‘expectation’ it increases the implication that rewards are being used to control rather than 
creating the impression that a reward is being given in recognition of behaviour that was voluntarily 
performed. In general in order to avoid rewards being seen as controlling steps should be taken to 
minimise using an authoritarian style or creating an impression of pressure. Furthermore, it helps if 
there is choice in how the rewarded task is carried out and if the interesting or challenging aspects of 
the task are emphasized (Ryan, 1982).
Perhaps in reaction to the negative effect that a perception of being controlled can cause, some have 
even started referring to incentive and behavioural techniques as ‘nudges’. The term ‘nudge’ is used 
to give the impression that these techniques ‘nudge’ (i.e. gently move) people towards the right choice 
rather than controlling or forcing them (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The term ‘nudge’ is therefore, given 
that people generally dislike feeling controlled, a clever bit of marketing. Care should be taken, however, 































that decision makers do not buy their own spin and start to think that ‘nudges’ are a new or special 
type of intervention rather than just a new name for old methods of control and inf luence. Rather, 
the idea of a ‘nudge’ should be taken as what it is; a way to sell regulations, new technology, and 
environmental interventions in a fashion that is more palatable to other decision makers, consumers, 
and the general population.
The idea that feeling controlled reduces the effectiveness of a reward can be linked to self-eff icacy 
theory (Bandura, 1982) as well as to Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) (Deci, 1975). Self-eff icacy is, 
simply put, the idea that people tend to do, and try harder to do, things they believe that they are 
capable of doing. Since self-eff icacy is based, partly, in feeling in control (Bandura, 1982), the feeling 
of being controlled or having control taken away from you by an external reward could reduce an 
individual’s self-eff icacy and therefore cause them to stop trying. Similarly, CET states that people 
have an innate need to be competent and to self-determine their behaviour (Deci, 1975). CET states 
that rewards or positive feedback could potentially increase feelings of competence, however, if the 
reward or feedback is given in a controlling fashion this could impact on the need of an individual to 
self-determine their behaviour and therefore may have negative consequences on their motivation (e.g. 
Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001). The controlling effect of rewards has even led some to argue against 
the use of rewards completely, as controlling people in any fashion is seen by some as immoral (e.g. 
Kohn, 1999). 
3.2.1 External and internal motivation and rewards
A less extreme argument put forward against the use of external rewards is that they may decrease 
intrinsic motivation to perform the behaviour being rewarded, meaning that once the external reward 
is gone people may no longer be motivated to perform the behaviour (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; 
Cameron et al., 2001; Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001). Also the reduction in intrinsic motivation may 
reduce the pleasure or sense of moral correctness that an individual feels for performing a specif ic 
behaviour, replacing it with the motivation to simply gain external reward (Deci, 1975; Deci et al., 1999; 
Gneezy et al., 2011). If these negative impacts on intrinsic motivation do occur, it is obviously something 
to be concerned about, although it could be argued that since the reward is never removed from PAYD 
insurance, unless the customer quits, then these concerns will not apply as strongly. 
To be clear, intrinsic motivation is def ined as when a behaviour or activity is performed with no 
apparent external reward, except for those that come with doing the behaviour itself (Deci, 1975). 
In contrast, someone is said to be extrinsically motivated if there is an external control acting to 
encourage the behaviour or activity that is being performed (Cameron & Pierce, 1994). While there 
is some argument if there is even such a thing as a behaviour that can be performed for no external 
reward (e.g. Bandura, 1986; Cameron et al., 2001; Dickinson, 1989; Skinner, 1972), a simplif ication of the 
intrinsic versus extrinsic distinction would be that intrinsically motivated behaviours are done only for 
your own personal gratif ication or because you feel personally that they should be done no matter 
the external reward. Whereas extrinsically motivated behaviours are done in order to gain something 
from the environment or world around you. 
The argument that external rewards reduce intrinsic motivation is a long, complex, and controversial 
one. Perhaps the best example of this controversy is a conf licting series of meta-analytic studies that 
have examined the literature on this subject but came to quite different conclusions (Cameron & Pierce, 
1994; Cameron et al., 2001; Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001). The f irst meta-analytic study in this 
series was published by Cameron & Pierce in 1994 and came to the conclusion that there was no good 
evidence for external rewards decreasing intrinsic motivation. In more detail they reported that verbal 
rewards (positive feedback) tend to increase intrinsic motivation and that only if external rewards are 
given for just doing a task do they result in any decrease in intrinsic motivation. Meaning, that only if 
a reward was given for simply trying to do the task, and not based on certain level of performance, 













































it is there any negative impact. Cameron and Pierce (1994) also join some earlier authors (e.g. Bates, 
1979) in criticising the research methods used to assess the impact of rewards on intrinsic motivation, 
noting that most studies include no baseline measurements of intrinsic motivation, only present the 
reward once, and do not check to see if the reward is motivating, i.e. that the reward is a reinforcer. 
Cameron and Pierce (1994) follow these criticisms up by pointing out that if the few, within-subjects 
designed, studies in this area that have taking baseline measures and provided multiple reinforcements 
are examined then there is no clear evidence of any reduction in intrinsic motivation once the rewards 
were stopped (e.g. Davidson & Bucher, 1978; Feingold & Mahoney, 1975; Mawhinney, Dickinson, & Taylor, 
1989; Vasta, Andrews, McLaughlin, Stirpe, & Comfort, 1978). Furthermore, based on the f indings of their 
meta-analysis Cameron and Pierce (1994) claim that CET (Deci, 1975), one of the most popular theories 
that predicts a reduction in intrinsic motivation to follow the removal of extrinsic rewards, should be 
abandoned. 
The next meta-analysis in this area, was published initially by Deci, Ryan, and Koestner (1999), and 
summarised by Deci, Koestner, and Ryan in 2001. In the publications Deci, Ryan, and Koestner pointed 
out some methodological problems with the Cameron and Pierce (1994) study, added some additional 
studies, and also made a crucial point about the impact of rewards on intrinsic motivation. That crucial 
point being that the reductions in intrinsic motivation after the addition of external rewards only 
applies to interesting tasks. That is to say that tasks that are dull or uninteresting do not suffer from 
reductions in intrinsic motivation after the addition of external rewards as they are not particularly 
intrinsically motivating anyway. That there is no demotivating impact of external rewards on dull tasks 
f its well with research that has also found that as a task becomes more cognitively demanding or 
creative then rewards become less effective in producing increases in performance (Bonner, Hastie, 
Sprinkle, & Young, 2000). That external rewards only have a negative impact on interesting or creative 
tasks is quite good news for those who would want to externally reward, through PAYD insurance for 
instance, safe driving behaviour, as safe driving behaviour can often be relatively simple, habitual, and 
subjectively dull. 
Deci, Ryan, and Koestner (1999) then report that, in contrast to Cameron and Pierce (1994), their meta-
analysis shows that there are signif icant decreases in intrinsic motivation associated with nearly all 
types of external rewards. With one exception, that being rewards given for just being present, i.e. not 
contingent on even trying a task, did not show any effects. Similarly to the previous meta-analysis they 
also found that positive feedback could increase intrinsic motivation and that unexpected rewards did 
not impact on intrinsic motivation (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001). Although 
Deci, Ryan and Koestner (1999) do also point out that, in line with CET (Deci, 1975), positive feedback is 
only effective in increasing intrinsic motivation if not given in a controlling fashion (Deci et al., 2001). 
In response to Deci, Ryan, and Koestner (1999) another meta-analysis was carried out by Cameron, 
Banko, and Pierce in (2001). In this later analysis Cameron, Banko, and Pierce (2001) acknowledge the 
methodological problems pointed out by Deci, Ryan, and Koestner (1999) and attempt to correct them. 
Furthermore, they point out some methodological issues with the Deci, Ryan, and Koestner (1999) 
study and add a few additional papers into the meta-analysis. With one of the biggest changes in this 
later meta-analysis from the earlier Cameron and Pierce (1994) study being an examination of the 
impact of external rewards on low and high interest tasks separately. The results showed that not only 
is intrinsic motivation not negatively impacted by external rewards in the case of low-interest tasks but 
that intrinsic motivation for these dull, uninteresting tasks can be increased by adding external rewards. 
This is in line with the idea that rewards can be good at increasing interest in an activity that is not it 
itself particularly intrinsically motivating (Bandura, 1986). Such as, for example, staying below the speed 
limit or accelerating slowly and smoothly. 
In terms of the impacts of external reward on interesting tasks, as in the earlier meta-analyses there 
was an enhancing effect of positive feedback on intrinsic motivation (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Cameron 
et al., 2001; Deci et al., 1999). Cameron, Banko, and Pierce (2001) also found negative effects of external 













































negative effects were only if a test of intrinsic motivation, known as the free choice test (Deci, 1971) was 
examined. In the free choice test the reward is removed and then participants in a study are observed 
for a certain period to see if they continue to do the rewarded activity or not. However, if subjective 
ratings of motivation were examined instead of the free choice test no negative impacts were found.
That the meta-analyses described above all examined pretty much the same literature and came 
to quite separate results is not particularly helpful for anyone looking to implement rewards in an 
applied setting. However, there are some points that all the above authors seem to agree on; Firstly, 
that external rewards have no (or a positive) impact on the intrinsic motivation to perform dull or 
uninteresting tasks. As mentioned above, this is a promising f inding for the use of rewards to motivate 
people to do behaviours that they would usually have no or low interest in performing, such as certain 
dull, but safe, driving behaviours. Secondly, positive feedback seems to have an enhancing effect on 
intrinsic motivation. Although care should, according to Deci, Ryan, and Koestner (1999), be taken that 
the positive feedback is not given in a controlling manner. Finally, unexpected rewards also have no 
impact on intrinsic motivation. This last point, where rewards that are given with no prior knowledge 
of their ability to be received, is less useful for applied settings however, as once a unexpected reward 
has been given for a task once it is likely that further rewards for the task become expected. 
It is also worth restating that the studies used in the meta-analyses mentioned above usually only 
looked at a single period of reward delivery, followed by removal of the reward, and then an 
assessment of intrinsic motivation. However, in applied settings, such as with PAYD insurance, rewards 
are likely to be given multiple times and for extended periods before being removed, if they are 
removed at all. 
Two additional points about the use of rewards should also be made before moving on. The f irst is 
that as long as there is any chance that a reward or the maximum reward cannot be received then 
in addition to the reward a penalty has also been introduced. Therefore all the negative consequences 
associated with penalties may also come into play (Deci et al., 1999; Kohn, 1999). So for example in 
the case of a PAYD insurance plan where customers work towards a maximum 30% discount off their 
insurance premium, not managing to achieve the full 30% discount in a certain reward period may be 
perceived as a penalty. The second point is that there is some evidence that external rewards that 
are ‘task-inherent’ may not have a negative impact on intrinsic motivation. That is to say that rewards 
that are associated with the task, so for example discounts on car insurance with driving, are not 
demotivating. Whereas, rewards that are not normally associated with a task, say for example movie 
tickets as a reward for safe driving, may have more of a negative effect, at least for interesting tasks 
(Bates, 1979).
3.3 Rewards, penalties, and feedback in the driving environment 
One of the largest problems in driver safety is that driving, at an individual level, is relatively forgiving 
and rewarding of risky behaviour (Fuller, 1984; Näätänen & Summala, 1974; OECD-ECMT, 2006b; 
Rothengatter, 1988). However, as mentioned above the consequences, good or bad, that are 
experienced most often are those that will have the largest impact on behaviour (Skinner, 1974; 
Thorndike, 1911; Watson, 1917). In the case of the road environment positive feedback in terms of 
positive feelings and perceived time savings, on risky behaviour, such as speeding or rapid accelerations, 
is often very swift and certain (e.g. Rothengatter, 1988). Conversely, the potentially large and serious 
consequences of unsafe behaviour are seldom experienced by any one individual and in the case of 
death or serious injury a driver may never have the chance to learn from such consequences (Fuller, 
1984; Näätänen & Summala, 1974). For example an average driver in the US has only a 0.09 probability 
of being involved in an accident per year of driving, with the chance of being injured or killed in such an 
accident being even lower (Evans, 2004).







































a safe driver generally gets is reaching their destination without incident. However, given the generally 
forgiving and low risk nature of the road environment the risky driver also usually arrives at their 
destination without incident and gains more immediate pleasure and other rewards for doing so, e.g. 
time savings, the approval of peers, gaining an advantage over other traff ic, and so on (Fuller, 1984; 
Fuller, 1992). Furthermore, the safe driver may be punished for their behaviour by feeling increased time 
pressure or the aggression and/or disapproval of other motorists. 
In terms of the off icial, legislative, use of reward and penalties in road safety the use of reward is 
relatively rare. However, some studies have looked at the provision of information about driving and 
the consequences of behaviour. Advisory ISA systems, discussed above, are one such informational 
channel that has been investigated and shown to be effective in reducing speeding (e.g. Brookhuis & 
de Waard, 1999; Lahrmann et al., 2011; Päätalo et al., 2002; Regan et al., 2003; Sundberg, 1999). The use 
of road side speed warnings, particularly around work areas, has also been investigated and shown 
to have signif icant impacts on driver speed (Roberts & Smaglik, 2012; Sorrell, Sarasua, Davis, Ogle, & 
Dunning, 2007). Incentive schemes to increase seatbelt use, particularly in US States where seatbelt use 
was not mandated, have also been found to have signif icant effects in both the short and long term 
(Hagenzieker, Bijleveld, & Davidse, 1997). With some studies reporting a doubling of, initially low, safety 
belt wearing rates immediately after rewards were introduced (e.g. Geller, 1984; Geller, Rudd, Kalsher, 
Streff, & Lehman, 1987). 
In contrast to the relative lack of reward systems in off icial attempts to improve road safety, penalties 
are extensively used via laws and associated enforcement efforts. Furthermore, it is quite usual for 
policy makers to focus on the less effective element of the severity of penalties (e.g. higher f ines, stricter 
sentencing) rather than the more effective aspect of the certainty that punishment occurs due to 
the relative ease of adjusting penalty severity (Armour, 1984; Bjørnskau & Elvik, 1992). Although, as 
mentioned previously, speed cameras and other automated speed enforcement devices are attempts 
to increase the certainty of detection. However, even in the case of automated speed enforcement the 
swiftness with which a penalty is actually received can be relatively slow. 
In terms of environmental behaviour, fuel use is a bit more of a feedback, reward, and penalty system 
that can be coupled with driver behaviour. However, while some modern cars may show the current 
fuel use, most old vehicles only show the amount of fuel left and this information is not as immediate 
in terms of linking current moment-to-moment behaviour with fuel use and environmental impacts. 
Furthermore, the real cost of fuel use, or benef it of eco-driving, is not truly apparent until drivers are at 
the pump, which is somewhat removed from the actual task of driving. Larger environmental impacts, 
such as climate change, are also largely invisible. It is because of this lack of clear and immediate 
feedback that some have suggested that feedback on moment to moment eco-driving be added to 
vehicles (e.g. Barkenbus, 2010; Meschtscherjakov, Wilf inger, Scherndl, & Tscheligi, 2009). 
Ultimately, the naturally low feedback environment of driving in terms of rewards for both 
environmental and safety effects and a strong focus on punishment in road safety leaves an obvious 
gap for an immediate and continuous reward system. PAYD insurance could be a good candidate to f ill 










































Feedback, especially if it is provided in a timely and non-controlling fashion, has been shown to have 
positive impacts on behaviour and intrinsic motivation (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Cameron et al., 2001; 
Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001). What rewards, penalties, and feedback do is essentially provide 
information to an individual on the consequences of their behaviour (Skinner, 1953). However, rewards 
and feedback can be framed and presented in different ways and can also be associated with various 
additional persuasive approaches such as comparisons, conformity, framing, goal setting, modelling, 
framing, and reciprocity (Bolderdijk, Steg, Geller et al., 2012; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Cialdini, 2001; Cialdini 
& Goldstein, 2004; Lehman & Geller, 2004; Lehman et al., In Press). These persuasive approaches can, 
much like rewards and feedback, help highlight the consequences of behaviour after it has occurred. 
However, some other approaches can be used before behaviour occurs, such as getting a commitment 
or goal setting, again in the hope that they persuade individuals to perform or not perform a targeted 
behaviour. Both types of approach for persuasive behaviour change are discussed in this section. 
4.1 Conforming to authority
In general people respond to others that have high status or authority (Cialdini, 2001). This is because it 
is impossible and quite effortful for everyone to have all the information and expertise needed to make 
every decision. Therefore the opinions of experts and other authority f igures can be used as short cuts 
or easy heuristics for decision making (Lehman et al., In Press). 
The responsiveness to authority does, however, depend on how authority is exerted. Cialdini and 
Goldstien (2004) identify two types of tactics that can be used to imply and exert authority, soft and 
hard. Soft tactics refer to factors of authority that come from the individual or organisation themselves. 
These include if the individual is liked or if they appear credible based on their own abilities and past 
behaviour. As such, this kind of soft authority can also sometimes be referred to as expert authority. 
Hard tactics on the other hand come from authority that is solely related to the position of the 
individual or organisation in social structures, which is sometimes referred to as legitimate authority. 
Legitimate authority applies, for example, if someone is higher up than you in an organisation but 
you have no idea if they are capable or not. These tactics are not mutually exclusive in that someone 
can have both soft and hard authority. However, given that soft authority is based on actually 
demonstrating ability and credibility, people or organisations that primarily exert soft authority are 
generally preferred by individuals. For example in work conditions where an employer is perceived as 
credible and competent, employees usually rate their job satisfaction as higher than if the employer 
primarily relies on hard tactics for exerting their authority (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). That the 
application of hard tactics, or legitimate authority, is more likely to breed dissatisfaction or resistance 
is also likely tied to the fact that it is more likely to be perceived as controlling and people generally 
do not like perceiving that they are being controlled (Brehm, 1966; Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001; 
Skinner, 1972). So, the message that an authority sends is altered by an individual’s perceptions of to 
what extent that authority is an expert and how legitimate it is in terms of the social structure (Cialdini 
& Goldstein, 2004). 
Messages may also be coloured by what an authority is perceived to gain by exerting their authority 
and the broadness of the issue in terms of societal impact. For example, in a study examining power 
use, households were sent letters about reducing electricity use. Both letters were identical, except one 
gave the impression it came from the government and the other from the impression that it was from 
a power supply company. The letter that was supposedly from the government was more effective 
in reducing electricity use (Craig & McCann, 1978). It is possible, in this case, that the government was 
viewed as more credible as they have less to directly gain or lose from power savings and may be seen 
as a more credible source for the impact of power savings on society as a whole. Therefore, in the case 
of PAYD insurance it could be useful if insurance companies work with government and outside experts 
in order to assert soft, expert, authority on the effectiveness and desirability of PAYD systems. This is 
because businesses, like insurance companies, are generally assumed to have a self ish prof it motive. 










































research suggests that PAYD could decrease insurance revenues (Adkins, 2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008). 
Whereas, it may be that governments or outside experts are perceived more as having society at 
large in mind when advocating PAYD insurance and may even be able to communicate that customers 
and society, not insurance companies, are likely to be the largest benefactors of PAYD insurance (Adkins, 
2004; Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2011). This will of course depend on how legitimate or, more 
importantly, how expert and credible, a government or external expert is perceived to be (Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004) and on if they are perceived as being controlling or not (Brehm, 1966; Deci et al., 1999; 
Deci et al., 2001; Skinner, 1972). 
4.2 Conforming to others
People do not just follow those who have authority. There is also a general tendency for individuals to 
change their behaviour to match the way those around them are acting (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; 
Lehman et al., In Press). This tendency to conform could be because individuals perceive that others 
have information about a situation that they do not. This is called informative inf luence (Cialdini, 2001) 
and is, like conforming to authority, a type of cognitive shortcut or heuristic along the lines of ‘other 
people tend to do things for good reasons, therefore, it is usually safe to do what others are also 
doing’. Another reason to conform, called normative inf luence, is when people conform just to f it in 
with people around them. In this case, again effort is saved by not struggling against what others are 
doing but by just going along with the crowd (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Both informative inf luence and 
normative inf luence are strongest in situations new or unfamiliar situations (Cialdini, 2001).
Whether people are inf luenced informatively or normatively is in part related to how much consensus 
they believe exists around a topic and their own personal belief about that topic (Cialdini, 2001; Cialdini 
& Goldstein, 2004; Lehman et al., In Press). If people hold strong personal beliefs about an activity or 
behaviour, yet they perceive a strong consensus that is different to their own beliefs then it is more 
likely that if they conform it is due to normative inf luenced and wanting to f it in. However, if people 
only have moderate or low beliefs about an activity, then it is more likely that informative inf luence will 
play a role. In other words, if people do not hold strong opinions on a matter then they will be more 
likely to perceive that others have information that they themselves lack and vice versa (Erb, Bohner, 
Rank, & Einwiller, 2002). This may be a problem, as in the case of driving, it is common for the majority 
of drivers to strongly believe that they are skilled, capable, and safe (McKenna et al., 1991; McKenna, 
1993). Therefore, any information that is presented to drivers about the behaviour of others could be 
f iltered through their belief that they are safe drivers themselves. This f iltering may cause them to reject 
social pressures that suggest otherwise. 
The power of normative inf luence on conformity is in turn inf luenced by social norms. Social norms 
can be viewed as the rules or codes of conduct that we perceive the society around us to have. These 
social norms can take two forms (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Schultz et al., 2007). The f irst is an injunctive 
social norm, which are our perceptions of what others approve of or disapprove of. The other is the 
descriptive norm, which is simply what we perceive as what is normally done by others. Both injunctive 
and descriptive norms can inf luence conformity, and it is therefore advisable that normative messages 
attempt to use both types of norm. For example roadside signs showing that a majority of people 
were not speeding in an area have been found to reduce speeding behaviour (Van Houten & Nau, 
1983). However, care should also be taken when designing messages as to not inadvertently result in 
normative information that could result in behaviour opposite to that which was intended (Lehman et 
al., In Press). For instance, a PAYD insurance website could provide information that 80% of customers 
are routinely speeding. This information could be provided as part of a statement outlining the problem 
of speeding and trying to convince customers to reduce this behaviour. However, what is also being 
communicated is that a lot of people speed, and therefore it may create the perception that society 
at large does not disapprove of speeding (an injunctive social norm), and/or that speeding is what 
is normally done by other people (a descriptive social norm). Furthermore, this effect is individually 









































30% of customers routinely speed but a person, before this information was provided, thought that only 
10% of people routinely speed, they are again receiving information that society views speeding as more 
acceptable than they thought. 
Whether we conform to the wishes of another, or simply follow their behaviour as a guide to our own, 
also depends on how much we like that person or organisation. Indeed generally speaking the more we 
like someone or some organisation the more likely will we do as they do or comply with their requests 
and do what they want us to do (Cialdini, 2001; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). One explanation for liking 
producing conformity and compliance is the halo effect (Thorndike, 1920). The halo effect refers to 
another cognitive shortcut which says that people we f ind attractive in one way, either in appearance 
or behaviour, we tend to assume are also attractive in other ways. A common way of presenting this 
would be to say that if you f ind a movie star attractive then it is also likely that you think they are a 
good, intelligent, and caring person. Another example of the halo effect this could be to apply it to the 
user interface of a PAYD insurance website or in-car device. If this interface is attractive, easy to use, 
and likable then it may be that people trust and comply with the information that is provided there 
more than they would if it was not presented in an aesthetically pleasing fashion. Another way to 
take advantage of the halo effect is to have prominent members of a society or community promote, 
and preferably adopt and use PAYD insurance (Erdogan, 1999; Lehman et al., In Press). This type of 
endorsement is relatively commonly used by companies to promote their products (Erdogan, 1999) but 
is not without its risks especially if the prominent individual falls from grace or is not perceived to be 
credible. Credibility is one good reason to try and get any prominent person that is promoting PAYD 
insurance to also use it themselves. This shows consistency between what they are saying and what 
they are doing and increases their credibility, and therefore their authority (Cialdini, 2001), as well as 
increasing the potential halo effect. 
Another way to increase likability is to stress the similarities between the individual and the person 
or organisation that is trying to convince them to comply or conform (Lehman et al., In Press). The 
connection between liking and similarity is so strong that even faked information about similarities in 
names, birth dates, or f ingerprints can increase compliance with requests (Burger, Messian, Patel, del 
Prado, & Anderson, 2004). Organisations, such as insurance companies, cannot be similar to individuals 
in such a direct fashion. However, it is possible for an organisation to f ind out the values that are 
important to its customers and then stress that these values are also held by the company. In the case 
of PAYD insurance this could take the form of framing the insurance in terms of cost savings, safety 
benef its, or environmental impacts depending on what type of customer is being addressed or the 
majority concerns of the customer base. 
The way that information is communicated can also impact on individuals perceptions of liking. In 
particular if information is given in a way that more resembles a two-way dialogue then liking will 
increase (Dolinski, Nawrat, & Rudak, 2001). Dialogues are associated with closer relationships, thus 
the increase in liking when they are used, instead of monologues, which are more often associated 
with being given information or talking with strangers. Organisations can take advantage of this by 
taking care to provide plenty of opportunities for their customers to provide feedback. However, 
since dialogue must be perceived as two-way, care should also be taken that customers feel that the 
organisations responding quickly and fairly to their feedback. This may be cost prohibitive. 
4.3 Comparison and competition
As part of the processes of perceiving social norms and viewing the world around us we tend to also 
compare ourselves with others. These comparisons not only help us decide if we should conform to 
social expectations but also help us measure our performance against others and see if we exceed 
them or fall short. To compare ourselves against others is natural and can help to boost self-image by 
outperforming others and gaining status (Heffetz & Frank, 2011; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), motivate us to 














































those we consider our peers (Festinger, 1954; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990). 
Interventions and programmes such as PAYD insurance could therefore take advantage of the 
natural desire for comparison and provide information on the driving behaviour of their clients to 
each other in order for comparisons to be made. This could be done on an individual basis or by 
providing comparisons with what the average PAYD insurance driver of a similar peer group is doing. 
Comparisons could even be taken a step further by offering chances to compete and gain status or 
external prizes by outperforming others. However, this may not be a good idea as comparison and 
competition may actually lead to unwanted negative effects. Firstly, providing comparisons, particularly 
on an individual level, may raise privacy concerns which could lower the acceptance of PAYD insurance 
(Bolderdijk, Steg, & Postmes, 2012). These privacy concerns could be somewhat alleviated by offering 
customers an option to opt-out of comparisons or giving them control over who their data is 
compared against. 
However, there are other problems than privacy with comparisons that must still be considered. As 
mentioned above in reference to normative inf luence, the provision of information about what others 
are doing can have unintended negative effects. Meaning that people who are performing worse 
than others may be motivated to perform better but those who are performing better may actually 
start to perform worse (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Lehman et al., In Press). This was exactly the case in 
a study of household energy use where providing information on the average energy consumption in 
a neighbourhood decreased the energy use of high users but actually increased the energy use of low 
energy users (Schultz et al., 2007). 
Another risk is that while people do like being seen as higher than others, i.e. to gain status (Heffetz 
& Frank, 2011), they do not particularly like seeing others with higher status than themselves (Sundie, 
Ward, Beal, Chin, & Geiger-Oneto, 2009). Seeing others as having higher status than you is especially a 
problem if there is some kind of benef it or reward associated with being ranked highly, such as would 
be the case if competition was involved, and this can lead to resentment and disengagement with a task 
(Henderson et al., 2011). There is also some evidence that suggests that competition only motivates 
those at the top and can in fact have a negative demotivating effect on low performers (Bull et al., 
1987; Dye, 1984). In other words, while competition may encourage those who feel they can win, those 
who feel they cannot win may simply stop trying and start to feel negatively towards the competition 
and the organisation running it. Furthermore, one study, where pizza drivers were given a competed 
with each other for a reward based on seatbelt wearing and good intersection behaviour, even found 
that winning the competition temporarily lowered the performance of the prize winners (Ludwig, Biggs, 
Wagner, & Geller, 2002). Another potential downside is that if someone has won or been ranked 
highly but then falls down the rankings or fails to win again in the future they may also become more 
dissatisf ied than if they had never ranked highly or won in the f irst place (Henderson et al., 2011). That 
people can be extra unhappy about losing status after gaining it in the f irst place could be related to 
the idea that people are more sensitive to losses than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The idea of 
loss aversion will be discussed further in the later framing section (Section 4.5).
Finally, the majority of drivers consider themselves to be safer and more capable drivers than the 
average population, which signals a strong optimism or self-enhancement bias amongst drivers 
(McKenna et al., 1991; McKenna, 1993). Therefore, if drivers were presented with comparative data via a 
PAYD insurance system that shows they are worse than average; this may challenge their strong beliefs 
about their own abilities. When such strong self-views are challenged drivers may act to preserve their 
self-image, not by changing it to ref lect the new information, but rather by discrediting the source of 
the information and perhaps abandoning the PAYD insurance plan. 
Therefore, in light of the above issues it seems that the provision of comparative information or 
competition within a PAYD insurance system may be a less than optimal option. If any attempt to do so 
was still carried out, perhaps due to customer demand, it would have to be carefully monitored as to 














































4.4 Consistency, commitment, and goal setting
In general people like to believe that the way they are acting and behaving is consistent with that they 
believe. Furthermore, we generally expect others, whether they are individuals or organisations to also 
be consistent in this fashion (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). That people are motivated to be consistent and also 
expect it in others is likely why people often strongly believe attitudes towards driving are predictive of 
driving behaviour despite the evidence to the contrary (Rothengatter, 2002). 
The internal need to maintain consistency is, according to social psychologists, driven by a need to 
maintain a positive self-concept, both in their own view and in the view of others (Cialdini & Trost, 
1998; Cialdini, 2001), and/or to avoid cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) is 
an uncomfortable feeling of tension that individuals experience when they perceive that they are not 
acting in a fashion that is consistent with their internal motivations. People generally wish to avoid 
experiencing cognitive dissonance and may even alter their behaviour ahead of time in order to 
prevent this unpleasant feeling 
Behaviour change interventions can leverage this desire to be consistent by getting people to make 
commitments or set goals for themselves. This creates a commitment to future behaviour that, 
especially if the commitment is made or goal is set publically, people may work hard to avoid breaking 
(Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Cialdini, 2001). Commitments and goals could therefore be used in conjunction 
with a PAYD insurance package. For instance when signing up for PAYD insurance new customers could 
be given the option to commit to, and set a goal of lowering their insurance bill by driving safely and 
economically. 
Such commitments and goals work better if they are made voluntarily (Cialdini, 2001), if the 
commitment is made in a more tangible form, such as writing (Lehman & Geller, 2004), and if the 
commitment is made publically (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Cialdini, 2001). In terms of the public nature of 
the commitment it is possible that clients who signed up for such a commitment with PAYD insurance 
could be given a sticker or similar reminder that proclaimed them as a safe and/or eco-friendly driver 
(insured by PAYD). Another possibility would be to get them to publically commit to a goal via a social 
networking site or in some other fashion. Commitments and goals also work better if people are 
given feedback on their progress towards the goal, or reminded that they have not met a commitment 
(Abrahamse et al., 2005; Bagchi & Li, 2011; Lehman & Geller, 2004; Lehman et al., In Press). However, 
given the previously discussed problems with comparisons (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Henderson et al., 
2011; Lehman et al., In Press), it is likely best that any commitments that are made or goals are made 
in reference to personal performance and not in comparison to other PAYD insurance customers. 
Furthermore, goals should be large enough to be worth the effort (Abrahamse et al., 2005), but small 
enough so that progress towards them is noticeable (Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Kivetz, Urminsky, & 
Zheng, 2006; Naylor & Ilgen, 1984). One way to achieve this large but near effect is to have a large 
goal set, say saving 30% on your next insurance bill with PAYD, which can be then made up with a 
combination of smaller sub-goals, such as earning a certain number of reward points in the next day. 
One famous commitment tactic that relies on the need of individuals to be consistent is the ‘foot-in-
the-door’ tactic (Freedman & Fraser, 1966). This tactic involves making a relatively small request of an 
individual, such as asking them to hold a pen for you, and then follow it up with a larger request, such 
as asking them to sign up for a PAYD insurance plan. The idea is that the small request is likely to be 
complied with, which then creates pressure to comply with the later, larger request in order to appear 
consistent and complete your dealings with the person or organisation involved (Burger & Caldwell, 
2003; Freedman & Fraser, 1966). The foot-in-the-door tactic can, however, backf ire if used too obviously 
as it then appears controlling and manipulative (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Getting people to commit 
to a free trial of PAYD insurance may be one ‘foot-in-the-door’ tactic that could increase the subsequent 
sign on for a PAYD product. 
The opposite of the ‘foot-in-the-door’ tactic is the ‘door-in-the-face’ tactic (Lehman et al., In Press). With 












































followed by a much smaller and now much more reasonable sounding request ‘Door-in-the-face’ may 
be more risky than ‘foot-in-the-door’ as it starts with an initial refusal. However, an example that could 
be used for PAYD insurance is a notif ication that base insurance rates are going to have to increase 
in order to cover the costs of high-risk drivers and then following this up with information on PAYD 
insurance and its lower costs. This may, however, still backf ire if people have enough time to think 
about the situation and compare alternatives. In fact, both ‘foot-in-the-door’ and ‘door-in-the-face’ are 
most effective at times where people are tired, under time pressure, and working mostly automatically 
(Lehman & Geller, 2004; Lehman et al., In Press).
While commitments can work well there is also a risk associated with them. When an individual feels 
they are not meeting commitments then they will, as mentioned previously, likely experience the 
unpleasant sensation of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). When faced with cognitive dissonance 
people have two major options. They can change their attitudes and the way they think about the 
situation or they can change their behaviour. This means that in the face of information from a PAYD 
insurance system that their behaviour is not eco-friendly or safe rather than changing behaviour 
drivers may just change their view of themselves, i.e. that they don’t need to be as safe as what PAYD 
demands, or of the information, i.e. that the information is biased or misleading. This may especially be 
a problem with driving behaviour as drivers generally overrate their driving ability and view themselves 
as safe drivers (McKenna et al., 1991; McKenna, 1993). As such, any information to the contrary may be 
threatening to their self-image of a good driver and cause them to disregard the information. Making 
commitments, at least appear, voluntary may lesson this as people tend to keep commitments they 
make themselves, and therefore change behaviour, more commonly than commitments that are not 
chosen voluntarily (Cialdini, 2001). Luckily, however, the above problem also can happen in reverse, 
in that just performing a behaviour can result in a change in attitudes and cognitions about that 
behaviour (Bem, 1972). So, in the case of PAYD insurance, just trying out a PAYD product may increase 
acceptance for it as found in the Buxbaum (2006) trial where those who had tried PAYD insurance had 
more positive attitudes towards it than whose who had not. 
4.5 Framing
The way that information is framed, or how it is presented to people, can also impact their decisions. 
One such type of framing that is likely to affect PAYD insurance is loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). Loss aversion is the fact that, when considering options, people will work harder to avoid a loss 
than they will to get a gain. So for example people may try harder to avoid losing an already gained 
discount on insurance than they did to gain that discount in the f irst place. This aversion to loss is well 
established in studies where people are asked hypothetical questions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In 
fact in such studies it has been shown that people state that they would try just as hard to save $15 on 
a $150 purchase as they would to save $5 on a $50 purchase. A f inding that only further emphasises 
the economic irrationality of loss aversion and signals that people may work hard to get even small 
discounts. 
However, decision-making in real life is not often carried out in the same way that it is when 
considering a hypothetical situation in an experiment. As such, it is also useful to look at real world 
experiments of loss aversion in reference to PAYD insurance. We are only aware of one such 
experiment which was carried out by Bolderdijk et al (2011) who found no impact of framing the money 
available through a PAYD system as either a loss or a gain. The f inding of Bolderdijk et al (2011) could 
be, however, due to the fact that they relied on a website for communicating the information about 
the gains or losses. This means that people may not have been checking this website often and as 
mentioned previously feedback works best when given immediately and close to the behaviour that is 
meant to be effected (Skinner, 1974). 
Furthermore, one risk of trying to use loss aversion is that loss may be interpreted as a penalty or 




































in motivating behaviour (Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001; Kohn, 1999; Skinner, 1974). However, it is 
still worth carefully considering loss aversion as a tactic to increase behaviour change under a PAYD 
insurance plan. If such a decision was made, one way to use loss aversion could be to start progress 
towards an insurance discount or bonus with already some discount amount received. So for example 
if there is a 30% discount possible, the starting discount could begin already at 15% and then gains 
could be made on top of that in addition to the chance to lose that discount. Such an approach has 
an advantage of also giving an idea that progress towards a goal (of a 30% discount) has already 
been made and may lead to people being more committed towards achieving the goal due it being 
already underway (Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Kivetz et al., 2006; Naylor & Ilgen, 1984). However, further 
research in this area is needed.
Separate from any loss framing, the tendency to try for a goal that has already been made closer 
(Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Kivetz et al., 2006; Naylor & Ilgen, 1984) could also be taken advantage of 
by creating an impression of illusory or false progress. To do this an insurance package could be priced 
so that it initially appears that anyone signing up as already received 10% off (just for joining) and can 
work for an additional 30% but will always receive the f irst 10%. However, in such a case the insurance 
has been priced so that the 10% discount is actually what would just be a normal price for insurance. 
This is the same trick used by coffee houses that initially give you two stamps towards their loyalty card 
for a free coffee, making you feel like you have already made signif icant progress towards that goal 
even though that this is not the case. However, this tactic could be viewed as deceitful if discovered by 
customers.  
Another framing effect is to consider how a message is delivered. In the case of PAYD insurance there 
are expected benef its to the individual and society at large in terms of safety, the environment, and 
monetary savings. Given the large benef its for society it may be tempting to focus on these, however, 
talking about such societal benef its are more likely to be motivating for decision makers that can help 
implement PAYD than for individual customers. In terms of convincing consumers about PAYD, people 
are generally more responsive to smaller scale, personal and immediate, feedback on loss and gains 
(Abrahamse et al., 2005; Lehman et al., In Press; Slovic, Zionts, Woods, Goodman, & Jinks, 2011) so 
stressing the individual level benef its of PAYD is likely to be more effective. However, as mentioned 
several times previously drivers have a tendency to overestimate their driving skills so the majority 
of customers for PAYD insurance will already think that they are safe drivers. This may mean that 
messages about PAYD insurance resulting in safer driving may not be particularly effective if they 
concentrate on the behaviour of the individual who makes the decision to sign up for PAYD insurance. 
An exception to this is that the benef its of telematic based PAYD insurance could likely be sold as a 
safety device in the event of an accident that notif ies the relevant emergency services and as a safety 
device in the event of car theft. In the case of accident alerting and theft protection these messages 
are framed in terms of threat removal and therefore reference the general risks on the road, not the 
individuals own behaviour, and are less likely to threaten an individual’s self-image as a safe driver. 
Another exception could be if PAYD insurance is being marketed towards the parents of young drivers. 
In this case the safety benef its are for their children, rather than the parents themselves and therefore 
will again not threaten the self-image of the parents but reassure them that their child will be protected. 
However, while such marketing might work on parents, it may be resented and be seen as controlling 
by the young drivers themselves (Gesser-Edelsburg & Guttman, 2013). Such resentment may in turn not 
result in much loyalty to the insurance product in the long run. In other words, PAYD insurance forced 
upon a young driver by a parent may be seen as a restriction to escape. Given that the parents may 
be also paying for the cost of insurance the young driver would also be unlikely to directly experience 
any of the f inancial benef its of PAYD, leaving only the negative aspect of being monitored. As such, it 
may be better to focus individual level PAYD messages on the monetary benef its for the individual, and 
if relevant, their family. 
The monetary benef its of PAYD insurance do not threaten the safety image of the driver rather they 




































However, as mentioned in the rewards section monetary benef its do have to be big enough to 
motivate people. Also, feedback on how to gain, and the receipt of, these benef its should be given 
in a clear and immediate fashion (Skinner, 1974). That monetary benef its must be big enough could 
potentially be a problem for PAYD insurance when combined with immediate feedback as the moment 
to moment monetary gain is likely to be small. Plus, even the monetary gain over a larger time period 
may not be large. As mentioned in the rewards section of this report (Section 3) one solution to deal 
with the problem of small monetary amounts is to use another medium, such as points, which can vary 
more freely and therefore provide richer feedback to the drivers (Bagchi & Li, 2011; Hsee et al., 2003). 
The f inal way in which the benef its of PAYD insurance could be framed is in terms of environmental 
gains. Environmental gains can be hard to communicate as they are a large scale societal issue. 
However, in modern times acting (or to be seen to be acting) in a pro-environmental fashion can be 
a pleasant and motivating experience for some people, especially women, it seems (Delhomme et al., 
2010; Polk, 2003). As such, some researchers have suggested that feedback on how driver behaviour 
is effecting the environment may be more motivating than stressing small monetary gains (Bolderdijk, 
Steg, Geller et al., 2012; Delhomme et al., 2010). For instance, Bolderdijk, et al. (2012) argue that pro-
environmental messages are more effective as they allow a person to see themselves as a good, moral, 
decision maker. Whereas framing benef its in a monetary fashion may lead people to see themselves 
as motivated by money, which in turn may be associated with greed. However, the research around 
the claim that pro-environmental messages may be more effective is still relatively new, so care should 
be taken with using such an approach. It may be, for instance, that the effects are related to novelty 
as people are not used to being given direct information on the environmental impact of their actions 
and therefore the effectiveness of such messages may wear off over time (Delhomme et al., 2010). It 
is also possible that pro-environmental information may be motivating for some people but not for 
others. Therefore, for now it may be safer to combine pro-environmental messages with information on 
monetary saving, perhaps represented as point gain to break the immediate connection with money 
and therefore with greed. It may also be that pro-environmental messages could be more effective at 
encouraging signing up to PAYD insurance, whereas momentary feedback on monetary saving may 
be better for changing behaviour when driving, or vice versa. However, more research in this area is 
needed. 
4.6 Prompts and modelling
Prompts are simply reminders or instructions to perform certain behaviours and modelling is the 
provision of a demonstration on how to perform behaviours. Prompts, therefore, are most useful when 
a behaviour is already known, relatively simple and easy to perform, shown when the target behaviour 
can be performed, and if stated in a polite and non-controlling fashion (Lehman & Geller, 2004). As 
such, prompts can remind or alert individuals to the expected social norms or provide information 
that could otherwise be missed. An advisory ISA that alerts drivers when they exceed a speed limit 
is an example of a prompt (Regan et al., 2003). Within PAYD insurance prompts could be given via 
immediate in-car feedback on current behaviour and the associated costs and benef its. In addition just 
the obvious presence of a PAYD system within a vehicle may have an effect of reminding drivers that 
their behaviour is being monitored.  
Modelling on the other hand is better for complex behaviour and for demonstrating how a reward or 
penalty system will operate (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Bandura, 1967; Lehman et al., In Press). In effect 
modelling, particularly when combined with a reward, clearly demonstrates what behaviour is desired 
and how it will be encouraged, which allows for observational learning (Bandura, 1967). In the case of 
PAYD insurance modelling is likely to not be useful in the vehicle but instead could be provided via online 
videos or driving simulations showing how a PAYD insurance system would operate. Such modelling 
should always be accompanied with showing the positive consequences of behaviour rather than 











































Reciprocity is the simple notion that people tend to feel that if someone or some organisation does 
something nice for them then they should do something nice for that person or organisation (Cialdini 
& Goldstein, 2004). In terms of PAYD insurance the desire to reciprocate can be taken advantage of 
by offering small free gifts when people sign up for PAYD or along with any offers of joining a PAYD 
insurance package. Providing a free trial of PAYD could also engender feelings of reciprocity. Particularly 






































Before moving on to the f inal section of this report we wish to brief ly discuss the idea of gamif ication, 
which is a term that has recently gained popularity (Deterding et al., 2011). At its most basic level 
gamif ication is sometimes referred to as adding game elements to a non-game activity. The idea is 
that since people enjoy playing games that the addition of game elements to a task, such as driving 
safely, may provide additional motivation for people to perform this task. Indeed, anecdotal evidence 
from studies that have looked at providing in-car feedback on eco-driving (e.g. Barkenbus, 2010) or safe 
driving (Mazureck & van Hattem, 2006) show that some proportion of people will use in-car feedback, 
such as could be provided by PAYD, as part of a ‘game’. For example people report things like making a 
‘game’ of seeing how long they can drive while keeping a feedback icon in the ‘green’ or by going as far 
as possible using only the battery of a hybrid vehicle. 
These above examples are different from gamif ication though, as they represent people voluntarily 
and spontaneously making a ‘game’ out of feedback that has been provided to them for a different 
purpose. Essentially what the people above are doing is playing with existing systems and f inding 
motivation and fun there for themselves. Gamif ication on the other hand is the deliberate addition 
of game design elements into a task (Deterding et al., 2011). As such, gamif ication usually takes the 
form of adding game elements such as external rewards (e.g. points, money, or brightly coloured 
badges) for performing tasks, the addition of ‘quests’ (goals and commitments), and/or the addition of 
competitive and comparative elements. All of which are nothing new. In fact, in many ways gamif ication, 
much like ‘nudges’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), is just a rebranding of well-established behavioural and 
social psychology ideas. In the case of gamif ication this rebranding is also being done in an attempt 
to associate gamif ication with the modern popularity of computer games and therefore with fun. 
However, gamif ication, in itself, has no real association or guarantee of producing fun or play and does 
not necessarily turn the activity into a game (Deterding et al., 2011). That is to say that just adding 
external rewards and comparisons to a non-game and saying it has now been ‘gamif ied’ does not 
necessarily make the activity fun or a game and therefore such additions may have no motivational 
effect. For example, a recent study conducted over 1.5 years looking at the gamif icaiton of a web based 
marketplace used by over 3,000 users found that there was no overall increase in the use of the service 
in relation to the addition of the gamif ication elements (Hamari, 2013).
Furthermore, many of the ways that gamif ication can be implemented are actually potentially negative, 
i.e. the addition of competition and comparison can actually demotivate people (Abrahamse et al., 
2005; Henderson et al., 2011; Lehman et al., In Press). As can the provision of required and therefore 
controlling external rewards and goals (Cialdini, 2001; Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001). Gamif ication, 
unless very carefully done, also misses several main motivating factors of games, i.e. that they are usually 
entered into voluntarily and that they are fun. Gamif ication therefore, if it is to be implemented should 
take care that any ‘game design’ system used is voluntary, meaning that customers either opt-in or 
out-out of such a system, and that the negative effects associated with the behavioural and social 
tactics that gamif ication rebrands are avoided. Care should also be taken with gamif ication as there 
may also be a novelty element to it that will wear off. Certainly, further research into gamif ication 









6. Conclusion and 
recommendations for 
PAYD insurance
The strength of PAYD insurance is ultimately in its ability to add much needed behavioural feedback to 
the driving task. By this feedback PAYD insurance can help to correct a major issue with driving; that 
safe and eco-friendly behaviour is often unrewarded, whereas the consequences for unsafe behaviour 
are rarely negative and can actually often be positive (Fuller, 1984; Fuller, 1992; Näätänen & Summala, 
1974; Rothengatter, 1988). The potential to provide useful feedback is strongest for PAYD insurance 
systems that make use of a telematics system. Telematics increase the certainty and swiftness with 
which target behaviour can be detected which is in line with good behavioural guidelines for providing 
feedback and rewards (Skinner, 1974). Likely candidates for behaviour are speeding, distance travelled, 
changes in acceleration, location of driving, and time of driving. Additional bonus services such as 
accident reporting, theft protection, and advisory ISA could be optional extras on top of, or included 
with, a telematics PAYD system in order to make PAYD look more attractive. Phrasing these additional 
options as ‘free extras’ for signing up with PAYD insurance may help encourage the acceptance of 
PAYD insurance by increasing liking and encouraging reciprocity (Cialdini, 2001; Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004). Adding advisory ISA to PAYD insurance is particularly attractive as advisory ISA has been found 
to decrease average driving speeds by as much as 5 km/h (Brookhuis & de Waard, 1999; Lahrmann, 
Agerholm, Tradisauskas, Berthelsen, & Harms, 2011; Päätalo, Peltola, & Kallio, 2002; Sundberg, 1999). 
Many current PAYD insurance systems provide feedback on driving via a web based interface (see 
section 2). This is not optimal, as such websites must be voluntarily checked by the client, away from the 
driving task, and the actual reward for behaviour is not received until months later when an insurance 
bill arrives. Therefore, receiving the reward and feedback on behaviour is delayed and many people 
may not even check these websites. An obvious solution to this is to provide immediate in-car feedback 
on both the rewards being received and the behaviour that is producing the reward. If provided in a 
clear, non-distracting, and immediate fashion, in-car feedback would meet all the requirements of a 
good reward intervention (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Bolderdijk, Steg, Geller et al., 2012; Skinner, 1974).
In addition to an in-car device there is still some use for a website for feeding back data collected 
by telematics based PAYD insurance. Such a website should focus more on providing aggregate 
information on consumers driving, e.g. total miles driven, total fuel saved, and so on. What information 
to provide should also be guided by surveys of clients but care should be taken to present the 
information, both on the website and in-car, in a clear, non-judgemental, non-controlling, polite fashion. 
Such information should not, therefore, be used to castigate or admonish a driver for bad behaviour 
as this may reduce the effectiveness of PAYD insurance (Brehm, 1966; Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001; 
Skinner, 1972). Rather advice and modelling should be provided as to how they can improve and save 
themselves money on their insurance (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Bandura, 1967; Deci et al., 1999; Deci 
et al., 2001; Lehman et al., In Press). In other words, the stress should always be on what the driver 
can do, not what they should not be doing. Furthermore, the issue of whether to present information 
framed in terms of monetary savings, environmental impacts, or safety impacts needs further research 
(Bolderdijk, Steg, Geller et al., 2012). For now, it may be best to use all three, although again they should 
be presented non-judgementally and care should particularly be taken with safety messages as drivers 
tend to view themselves as already being safe (McKenna et al., 1991; McKenna, 1993). These optimism 
biases mean that messages that suggest that their driving behaviour is unsafe could be dismissed by 
drivers or cause them to disengage with PAYD insurance. It may be best to also mostly focus feedback 
on the insurance savings and the behaviour that is causing them and leave feedback on safety or the 
environment to optional panels or tabs on a website. By making feedback on the environment or 
safety optional it means that those who are interested could check it. But that at the same time such, 
potentially more judgemental, information would not be forced upon all customers. 
It is also possible that a PAYD website could be used by drivers to set goals for themselves. It would 
also be useful to give customers the option to publically share these goals, as public commitments to 
goals are generally more effective (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Cialdini, 2001). Although sharing their goals 
and progress should only be relatively unobtrusive and not be forced upon customers. That said, it 
may be useful if customers who sign up to PAYD insurance are given some kind of reminder that they 































in the form of a sticker or something similar that they could voluntarily chose to put on their vehicle. 
Again, such public commitments have been found to increase the effectiveness of behaviour change 
programmes as they serve to remind people of the commitment they have made and enhance feelings 
of wanting to be consistent with that commitment (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Cialdini, 2001). A PAYD 
insurance website could be further enhanced by providing regular, e.g. monthly, email summaries of 
certain positive aspects of driving behaviour. Such email summaries will also serve as prompts to visit 
the website but should also be able to be opted-out of in case they are viewed as nuisance or too 
controlling. 
However, based on the literature, what PAYD insurance data should not be used for comparisons 
with other PAYD customers on either on an individual or aggregate basis. Such comparisons risk 
demotivating those who are not doing well, or providing unintended normative information that may 
actually encourage bad behaviour (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Bull et al., 1987; Lehman et al., In Press). 
Care should also be taken when designing the aesthetics and usability of a PAYD insurance website 
and any associated in-car interface in order to take advantage of the ‘halo effect’ (Thorndike, 1920). 
Effectively, the ‘halo effect’ means that an interface that is easy to use and attractive will enhance 
not only the positive experiences that customers will have interacting with the system but also how 
effective and worthwhile they perceive the system to be. 
In terms of the reward structure of a PAYD system, rather than being specif ically charged a set amount 
per kilometre driven it may be advisable that clients are instead working towards a certain discount off 
their next insurance bill or renewal. This means that the focus is on gaining or losing a future discount, 
rather than gaining a charge that will eventually have to be paid. By having people gain a discount, 
this may frame PAYD insurance as a reward to be earned rather than a punishment to be avoided. In 
addition, by working for a discount, it means that clients will have the perception that they will never be 
charged more than a set amount for their insurance. 
That there is a set maximum and set minimum that clients will pay will also help reduce the cost of 
PAYD on insurance companies and make the forecasting of future income easier (Adkins, 2004; Bordoff 
& Noel, 2008). However, the effectiveness of a discount system in PAYD is largely unknown, as most 
estimates of the impact of PAYD insurance are based on a more direct mileage charge (Adkins, 2004; 
Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Litman, 2011; Zantema et al., 2008). On the other hand, once PAYD insurance 
has become wide spread, or if it was government mandated rather than voluntary, then a truly f lexible 
insurance package where what drivers pay is based on their directly driving, including extra charges, 
could be implemented. 
The use of telematics does mean that privacy concerns related to PAYD insurance will inevitably be 
raised. These can be lessened by stressing the benef its of PAYD (Bolderdijk, Steg, & Postmes, 2012) and 
providing strong, credible, assurances that all data will be kept secure and not shared with outside 
agencies. With the exception of data that may help in the case of an accident or theft. Related to 
privacy concerns, it also appears that offering a trial period in which customers can experience PAYD 
insurance for themselves may be valuable. Such a trial period may create a feeling of commitment 
(Cialdini, 2001; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Lehman & Geller, 2004; Lehman et al., In Press), helps 
demonstrate the benef its of PAYD insurance (Bolderdijk, Steg, & Postmes, 2012), and may increase 
feelings of reciprocity and liking towards an insurance company (Cialdini, 2001; Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004) . All of these factors should help lesson any privacy concerns and additionally also help increase 
the acceptance of PAYD insurance with potential customers. Furthermore, to increase acceptance it 
is recommended that insurance companies work closely with government and external experts to 
provide soft, or expert, information on the benef its of PAYD insurance to society at large as well as to 
individuals (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Such opinions may be more credible if coming from an outside 
source as there may be a perception that any new product an insurance company introduces must be 
only for self-serving prof it based motives. In addition, due to the costs involved there may be a need 
































Finally, additional research on PAYD Insurance both in lab settings and via large on-road trials is needed 
to give further directions on the way forward. Potential areas of interest, apart from the previously 
mentioned type of message (economic, safety, or environmental) could be looking at different types of 
reward (e.g. points versus money directly), how much reward is needed (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000), 
if loss aversion is effective or if is perceived as a penalty (Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001; Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979; Kohn, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), what data are customers most interested 
in, if PAYD insurance reduces intrinsic motivation to drive safely (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Cameron 
et al., 2001; Deci et al., 1999; Deci et al., 2001; Kohn, 1999) or creates negative behavioural adaptation 
(Fuller, 1984; Näätänen & Summala, 1974; OECD, 1990; Wilde, 1976), and if variable ratio schedules of 
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